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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a comparative study of conflict and opium in the Golden Crescent 
and Golden Triangle, focusing in particular on Afghanistan-Pakistan and Burma.  It takes 
a state building approach to analyze the formation and composition of opiate-funded 
“proto-states” in the two regions, with case studies on the Taliban and the United Wa 
State Party.  Historic, political, ethnic and cultural factors are explored in relation to each 
region and proto-state case.  The basic argument is that opium and opiate trade provided 
capital for the formation of basic state-like entities that conduct all the basic state-
building activities as defined in the literature.  What are often called “insurgent groups” 
are actually armies of proto-states.  What are often called “insurgencies” are actually 
conflicts between infant states in areas that never contained nation-states.  This paradigm 
suggests an alternate method to study these two areas: a method that emphasizes history 
and anthropology to understand the basic motivations and attributes of the proto-state 
actors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Good strategy presumes good anthropology and good sociology. 
- Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: MacMillan, 1973), 332. 
 
The bulk of the world’s supply of opium, licit and illicit, comes from a “greater 
South Asian opium belt” that stretches from the remote hills of Southeast Asia, through 
India, all the way to the eastern edge of the Middle East. At the west end lies the Golden 
Crescent, consisting of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, which is currently by far the 
leading producer of the world’s illicit opium supply.  At the east end of this belt is the 
Golden Triangle, consisting of Burma, Thailand and Laos, an area infamous for illicit 
opium in the past and still the major producer of heroin and methamphetamines in East 
Asia.  This production feeds a booming business: there are farmers, landowners, lab 
workers, precursor suppliers, security providers, tax collectors, logistics networks, 
distributors, and consumers in a network that spans the globe.  The international illicit 
drug trade associated with opium and its products nets billions every year. 
Asia’s opium belt also hosts a great deal of political instability and poverty that is 
particularly strong among ethnic minority groups.  In addition to drug problems, most of 
the states mentioned above have had to deal with multiple ethnic and ideological conflicts 
during the past 60 years.  For example, in some of these areas, nominal central states, 
opposition parties, insurgent groups, and warlords vie for the control of large swaths of 
tribal territory rich in difficult terrain and adjacent to largely disregarded “international” 
borders.  Many of these so-called non-state actors actually occupy territory and fund 
themselves in part through illicit trade in drugs and other commodities.  
Why are these conflicts particularly stubborn and long-lived, especially in the 
former colonial “frontiers” that are now Afghanistan-western Pakistan and Burma?  
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Many in the international community consider these entities failing states,1 an idea that 
assumes states actually existed in the first place.  Many observers, particularly in the 
media, describe drugs as a main, if not the main cause.  In fact, drugs are only part of the 
story.   These conflicts are complex, as they possess deep historical and cultural contexts 
with periodical injections of external influence.  To get at these more fundamental 
factors, the main research question of this thesis is: how do militias and insurgents create 
drug-funded proto-states within Afghanistan-Pakistan and Burma? 
A. IMPORTANCE 
There are two major reasons why it is important to understand how illicit drug 
production helps form proto-states and their armies.  First, illegal drugs are correlated 
with insecurity in Central, South and Southeast Asia, all regions in which the 
international community continues to have substantial military and developmental 
involvement.  This insecurity ranges from the conflicts already mentioned, to criminal 
activities that feed off the trade, such as arms dealing and human trafficking. Confronting 
insurgents and criminals effectively means being able to disentangle different actors and 
their motivations, and understanding the context in which they live and operate.  The 
question is often asked: “Which should we target—insurgents, drug production, 
traffickers, poverty?”  Or are there underlying factors that are more important? 
Secondly, and equally significant, is that the greater South Asian illegal drug trade 
supplies a large part of the world’s demand.  The effects of illegal drug use are clear. 
Many countries in Asia, such as Pakistan, Iran and Thailand, have massive addict 
populations, over which hovers the additional specter of human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).  In developed countries like 
the United States, illegal drug use flourishes in troubled urban centers, adding another 
dimension to the already daunting problems of socio-economic decay.  In response, 
powerful members of the international community have waged a century-long “War on 
                                                 
1 Afghanistan, Pakistan and Burma are ranked 8, 12 and 14, respectively, out of the 60 worst states, in: 
The Failed States Index 2007, Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine, July/August 2007, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865&page=7  (accessed May 1, 2008). 
 3
Drugs.”   This “war” has cost billions of taxpayer dollars in many different countries, 
particularly the United States, yet its efficacy remains widely debated. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The main research question leads to several significant sub-questions.  The most 
important are: What is the definition of a proto-state?  How do geography and socio-
cultural characteristics of the population particular to the Golden Crescent and Golden 
Triangle contribute to the formation of proto-states?  What role does the opium business 
play in the formation of proto-states?  What are the similarities and differences between 
these proto-states and conflicts in which they formed?  And, what can we learn from 
comparisons across the two different regions? 
The power of the states based in Kabul, Islamabad and Naypyidaw does not 
extend to certain areas controlled by fiercely independent ethnic groups traditionally 
organized in a feudal or tribal manner.  Historically speaking, neither the British Empire 
nor any kingdom or empire predating it ever exercised sustained control of these areas 
either. The 60-year old international boundaries that cut arbitrarily through these areas, 
created when the British left, are for the most part just lines on a map.  
At different periods since the colonialists’ departure, the tribes and fiefdoms of 
these areas have been involved in sustained conflicts.  This study argues that the 
economics (in particular the drug economies) of these wars, fought on one side by armies 
(“insurgents” to the limited states based in the aforementioned cities) from these tribes 
and fiefdoms, created “proto-states” in both regions.  More specifically, politically 
mobilized armies, with certain tribal, ethnic and feudal characteristics, built these entities 
based (to a significant extent) on capital from the taxation of opium production and 
transportation.  To best “farm” the opium trade in this manner, insurgents needed to 
control the cash-crop producing territory.  Being able to lay down the law and be 
recognized as the legitimate coercive force in a defined territory is at the very base of 
state building.  Viewed from a long historical perspective, it is not far-fetched to say that 
the areas commonly called Afghanistan, Pakistan and Burma are still in the midst of a 
kind of “warring states” period (with Burma probably further along in the process). 
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By adopting this state-building perspective, moreover, one can begin to identify 
the basic elements of these opium-belt “proto-states,” to provide a definition.  Farmers 
are the human capital.  Militias provide both the means of coercion and extraction.  
(Sometimes farmers and militiamen are one in the same.) Tribal structure provides lines 
of communication, trade contacts, and sometimes-hierarchical organizational structure.  
Landowners and militia leaders (who may also be tribal leaders, religious leaders, 
warlords or a combination of the three) provide the capital and management.  This will be 
the working definition for the proto-state. 
This thesis also argues that the motivations of the various actors within the proto-
state are tied to the evolution of its structure.  Although dealt with in greater detail later, a 
basic narrative using terminology from the “greed and grievance” literature (discussed in 
the literature review) follows.  The building of an opium-belt proto-state begins when an 
actor (tribe or ethnic group, or a coalition of such groups) attempts to establish its own 
political entity, usually in an impoverished “homeland” type of space, by mobilizing 
support through ideology, religion, ethnicity or a combination of the three.  It usually 
does this due to a grievance it has with the weak central state, which is really just a 
better-developed proto-state itself, or due to ethno-nationalism (creed), or both.  Though 
the actor may receive outside support, it is not a proto-state until it begins to use its own 
scant natural resources or industry to build its own forms of coercion (militias) within 
certain boundaries, which it does to avoid being defeated by other actors, such as other 
proto-states or even states.  Geographically and historically, the poor farmers of the 
proto-states are familiar with opium-poppy production.  Either due to the “need” to 
survive, force, high demand, or a combination of these three, the farmers increase 
production.  Due both to high demand and illicit status, the production of opium and its 
derivatives is a lucrative way to help fund a militia or army, and in some limited cases, 
actually provide services to the population.  A theme common across both regions is that 
the leaders of these groups or proto-states may succumb to “greed,” and attempt to profit 
personally from the drug trade, which sometimes leads to fragmentation of the groups or 
even the proto-state. 
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Some proto-states with substantial drug revenues, however, have managed to 
survive in both regions for a prolonged period.  These proto-states’ relative coherence 
ensures that their armies are more difficult to defeat.  Throughout this entire process, 
cultural characteristics play a very important role, which will be brought out in later 
chapters.  The Afghanistan-Pakistan and Burma regions both offer examples of long-
lasting and resilient militias (insurgents) for the very reason that proto-states exist therein, 
even if many of the details of the regions’ respective conflicts differ.  Case studies of the 
current Taliban movement, and the United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/A) clearly 
illustrate this phenomenon.  In addition, these two groups are of particular interest to the 
United States: the Taliban, because it is engaged in armed conflict with the U.S. and its 
allies, and is accused of providing a safe haven for Al Qaeda; the UWSP/A, because eight 
of its top leaders were indicted on “methamphetamine and trafficking charges” by a U.S. 
Federal Grand Jury in 2005, and the U.S. government has named the UWSA a “Drug 
Kingpin.”2 
 C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As this study draws upon a variety of theoretical viewpoints, the literature review 
is broken down into three parts: the state-building literature, the “states within states” 
literature, and the causes of civil war literature.  Each part discusses the relevancy of the 
literature to the topics of this thesis.  
1. State-building Literature 
For the purposes of this thesis, the state-building literature is applied to 
developments among the insurgent groups rather than the central state.  It is useful for 
both defining the proto-state, and determining to what extent the activities of insurgent 
groups have actually formed proto-states.  In this literature, Tilly espouses the most 
prevalent theory (based on a European model), which is that war makes states.3 Many 
                                                 
2 Drug Enforcement Administration News Release, January 24, 2005, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/nyc012405.html (accessed April 15, 2008). 
3 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: A. D. 990-1992 (Malden, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishing Limited, 1993), 20. 
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scholars support this, such as Rasler and Thompson, who claim a quantitative correlation 
between war and state building.4 A subcomponent of this approach is Tilly’s claim that 
war making and state making are the same as organized crime, in that “coercive and self-
seeking entrepreneurs” perpetrate the activities.5  Schwartz, in agreement, points out that 
these “mafias” struggled for control of “microeconomies,” with the end result being 
“mercantilism.”6  Also at the core of the European model is sociologist and economist 
Max Weber’s definition of the state, particularly his discussion of the state having the 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”7 
Alternative viewpoints tend to argue for a more case-particular approach and cite 
non-Europe centric cases.  For example, Migdal examines developing countries and 
concludes that “social structure” is a powerful determining factor in state building.  
Forming “cohesive states” is extremely difficult in “societies with fragmented social 
control.”8  Herbst examines the development of states in the “absence of war,” using 
African states as a case study, and concludes that they will be remain weak because they 
do not have the incentive of survival that major conflict breeds.  Therefore, one cannot 
hope that they will simply develop into strong states in the European model.9  Maroya 
takes an even more unconventional approach, arguing that in former colonial frontier 
areas, the traditional state-building process needs to be entirely rethought.  Citing 
Afghanistan and Burma among other examples, he notes that in these frontier areas  
 
                                                 
4 Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, War and State Making: The Shaping of the Global 
Powers (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
5 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, 
ed. Peter Evans, Dietrick Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
169. 
6 Herman Schwartz, States Versus Markets: The Emergence of a Global Economy (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994), 16-22. 
7 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills (New York: Galaxy, 1958), 77.  See also: Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline 
of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978), 212-213. 
8 Joel S. Migdal, “Strong States, Weak States: Power and Accommodation,” in Understanding 
Political Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntingdon (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 428-429. 
9 Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990): 137. 
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“…the roots of legitimacy for government within states are almost completely absent and 
political office becomes a form of predation and/or forum for advancing narrow ethno-
religious interests.”10  
Elements of each of these approaches are used here, in particular, application of 
Tilly’s simple yet powerful explanatory framework to the activities of an insurgent group 
to see if it has taken on any early-state characteristics.  As Migdal shows, however, this 
analysis is lacking if it does not include how social structure (in the case of this study: 
tribal structure) affects how insurgents do business.  Finally, Maroya’s approach, 
particularly due to its applicability to the regions covered here, lends credence to the idea 
that Afghanistan and Burma cannot really be viewed through the modern nation-state 
lens.  Perhaps the two can be more accurately assessed as passing through “warring 
states” periods, in which proto-states battle for independence or supremacy and for 
control over the resources that sustain and strengthen their coercive power. 
 2. States within States Literature 
This literature is broad and diverse, resulting in a laundry list of terms for 
describing areas with limited or no nation-state influence, and the entities that arise 
within these areas.  Scott calls such regions “geographically peripheral,” and notes their 
propensity for rebellion.11 Rabasa uses the term “ungoverned” territories,” for areas 
whose defining feature is the “lack of penetration by state institutions,” but includes the 
caveat that “complex societies” do exist in these areas.12 Goodhand, using Afghanistan as 
an example, describes as “borderlands” the non-state spaces in which “warlords compete 
with one another and embryonic central authority to establish their own regional ‘mini-
                                                 
10 Alex Maroya, “Rethinking the Nation-State from the Frontier,” Millenium – Journal of 
International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 267-269. 
11 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 197-198. 
12 Angel Rabasa, “Ungoverned Territories” (RAND Corporation testimony presented before the House 
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
February 14, 2008, 3), http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG561/ (accessed March 10, 2008). 
 8
states’.”13  McColl’s seminal work defines a territorial “insurgent state,” using the 
context of revolutionary conflict.  He claims that it is a necessary tactic of such 
movements, if they are to be successful, to hold territory from which they can transition 
into a “guerrilla” war.14  Spears applies the state-building literature in an attempt to 
tabulate a list of characteristics by which to evaluate state-like entities, which he calls 
“states-within-states.”  He argues that such entities are more fully developed than so-
called “shadow states,”15 and that often they are more state-like than the “quasi-states” 
against which they compete.16 
Specific to Afghanistan, Johnson makes reference to Taliban “shadow 
governments,”17 which suggests the emergence of proto-state structures along the lines of 
McColl’s and Goodhand’s works.  Giustozzi also references these “shadow 
governments,” referring to Taliban “strongholds” where limited political and judicial 
structures are emplaced.18  Apart from the Taliban, Goodson notes that warlords long 
associated with their own private fiefdoms continue to wield power.  Though they are 
ostensibly part of the fledgling central government, they control the means of coercion 
and economic extraction within their lands, and violent clashes still occur between some 
of them.19 
                                                 
13 Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” Journal of 
Agrarian Change 5, no.2 (April 2005): 193-194. 
14 Robert W. McColl, “The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution,” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 59, no. 4 (Dec., 1969): 614. 
15 William Reno, “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars,” in Greed and Grievance: 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2000), 45. 
16 Ian S. Spears, “States-Within-States: An Introduction to Their Empirical Attributes,” in States-
Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Paul Kingston and Ian S. Spears 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 16. 
17 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, no 2. (2007): 94.   
18 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 110-112. 
19 Larry Goodson, Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 1 
(January 2005): 25. 
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Moving on to Burma, a rather different picture comes to light.  Than observes that 
“former insurgent groups…maintain quasi-autonomous enclaves” in the northeast border 
areas.  These groups’ lists of state-like activities are impressive, ranging from taxation, to 
finance, and even “infrastructure development.”20  Thomson also uses the word 
“enclave,” but settles for the simple designator “minority group area,” and emphasizes 
that the people really only recognize the authority of “clan, tribe, or chiefdom.”21  
According to an international development project source in the region, the UWSP 
possesses its own government and state apparatus, and has even built roads and other 
infrastructure within its autonomous regions.22 
3.  Causes of Civil War Literature 
This thesis is also theoretically informed by the “greed versus grievance” causes 
of civil war literature.  The study of ethnic conflict in particular is relevant to this thesis, 
and so “traditional” explanations of civil war (sometimes called “grievance 
explanations”) are examined first. Sambanis argues that ethnic civil wars exist, and in 
particular, the presence of “ethnic heterogeneity” is a significant factor in such wars 
being fought.  He adds that ethnic wars are more likely to be influenced by political 
grievance than by economic factors.23  Kaufmann describes a clear-cut difference 
between ethnic civil wars and ideological civil wars, claiming that “ethnic identities” 
harden over the course of conflict, while ideological identities are much more 
“changeable” over time.  Control of territory is much more important in ethnic civil 
wars.24 
                                                 
20 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Burma/Myanmar in 2001: A Year of Waiting,” Asian Survey 42, no. 1 
(Jan.-Feb. 2002): 116. 
21 Curtis N. Thomson, “Political Stability and Minority Groups in Burma,” Geographical Review 85, 
no. 3 (July 1995): 269 and 280. 
22 Special Consultant to UN development project in Wa Special Region Number 2, Personal Interview, 
March 2008. 
23 Nicholas Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June, 2001): 280. 
24 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 
20, no. 4 (Spring, 1996): 138-140. 
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In contrast, scholars such as Collier, Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin emphasize the 
greed aspect of conflict, arguing that civil wars are not possible if the groups wishing to 
wage them do not have the required economic resources.  In a seminal study, Fearon and 
Laitin find that the existence of peripheral areas within a state that possess easily 
transported wealth—gems or drugs for example—are a significant factor related to the 
outbreak of civil wars.25  Collier and Hoeffler, over the course of three studies (1998, 
2004, 2007), eventually formulate their “feasibility hypothesis,” which “proposes that 
where rebellion is materially feasible it will occur.”26   
Of late, scholars like Arnson and Zartman, and Ballentine and Sherman attempt to 
temper economy of war studies by promoting a synthesis of greed and grievance 
explanations.27  It is the approach summarized by Zartman that this thesis uses in 
conjunction with its case studies, in particular: how need, creed and greed “relate to each 
other in causing and sustaining conflict, and how, not whether, conflict is related to these 
three factors.”28  Greed explanations are important for breaking down the opium 
economies of the proto-states and examining leaders’ motives.  Grievance explanations, 
particularly Kaufmann’s association of ethnic conflict with holding territory, are one 
significant element of an insurgency transforming into something more permanent.  
Licklider provides another finding of note with connotations for the case studies and 
policy recommendations of this thesis.  His claim is that “identity civil wars” are more 
effectively ended through “military victory” than through “negotiated settlements,” while 
                                                 
25 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American 
Political Science Review 97, no.1 (February 2003): 75, 81, 88. 
26 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and 
Civil War,” Center for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series 2006-10, August 7, 2006, 
www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2006-10text.pdf (accessed February 27, 2008). 
27 See: Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman, Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of 
Need, Creed, and Greed (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). See also: 
Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
28 I. William Zartman, “Need, Creed, and Greed in Intrastate Conflict,” in Rethinking the Economics 
of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, ed. Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman 
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 257. 
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“political/economic wars” are just as likely to end using either means.29  The case studies 
dealt with later show the complications of predicting outcomes when wars are a 
combination of identity and political/economic. 
There is little discussion in the literature on Afghanistan and Pakistan about the 
Taliban being anything other than a grievance or creed-motivated insurgency.  Rashid 
writes that it did benefit tremendously as an organization from the pre-2001 opium trade, 
but its leaders did not appear to personally benefit.30  There are, however, varying 
opinions in the literature as to what extent the current Taliban insurgency relies on opium 
money to fund their operations.  Johnson states: “Narcotics are responsible for at least 
one-half the GDP in the country in one way or another and, as a result, huge amounts of 
cash are flowing into the war chests of the insurgency.”31  However, Johnson (and others 
like Giustozzi) also writes that foreign funds from sympathizers in the Middle East 
represent a significant source of funding.  It is generally agreed that the Taliban at the 
very least tax the opium trade in return for “safe passage” through its areas.32  Hodes and 
Sedra claim a more extensive Taliban extraction system that includes taxation of 
production, transportation, and processing,33 
Turning to the Burma conflict literature, Smith paints the complicated picture of a 
civil war driven by multiple ethnic group and political/ideological grievances against the 
central government.34  McCoy, while agreeing with this thesis as the starting point for the 
conflict, shows how many of these groups were rapidly hijacked by greed due to the war 
economy of Southeast Asia (hot and cold), and enabling influences of both the Chinese 
and the Americans.  Various warlords-druglords rose and fell over time, and the leaders 
                                                 
29 Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” The 
American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 686. 
30 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 124. 
31 Johnson, 100. 
32 Giustozzi, 86-87. 
33 Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 39. 
34 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1999). 
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of the UWSP are one of the primary inheritors of this legacy.35  Kramer disagrees, 
arguing that it is Chinese syndicates that control the trade, and that the UWSP is a 
nationalist party.36  Lintner weaves a balanced narrative that obscures neither the greed 
nor creed aspects of the conflicts.  He also brings out the aspect of ethnic group poverty 
that drives some peasants to grow the opium poppy out of sheer need for survival.37  In 
response to Kramer, he claims that that the UWSP (and various insurgent groups from 
Burma’s past), were both nationalist parties/armies and drug lords.38 
Given this review of the applicable literature, it is apparent that many approaches 
exist to explain how conflict and loot seeking enable proto-state-building.  There are also 
several highly descriptive and comprehensive accounts of insurgency and drugs in 
Afghanistan/Pakistan and Burma.  However, sorely lacking are comparative studies 
regarding the convergence of drugs and insurgencies, how this convergence resembles a 
nascent state-building process, and what are the ramifications.  This thesis seeks to 
address this gap.  At the same time, an attempt is made to explain each case in its own 
particular context, or what anthropologist Clifford Geertz (borrowing from Gilbert Ryle) 
calls “thick description.”39  This method has the best explanatory power. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a combination of the historical, case study and comparative 
methods to support its arguments.  A historical/anthropological method is used to explain 
how the interconnectedness of opium production, insurgency and socio-cultural factors 
set the stage for proto-state development.  Then, keeping in mind Tilly’s analogy that 
                                                 
35 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Afghanistan, 
Southeast Asia, Central America, Columbia (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003). 
36 Tom Kramer, The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party? (Washington: 
East-West Center, 2007), 26-27. 
37 Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 
1999). 
38 Bertil Lintner, “Doing Wrong to Do Good,” The Irawaddy News Magazine, December 2007, 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9482 (accessed January 3, 2008). 
39 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
Publishers, 1973), 6. 
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state building is, in the beginning, organized crime, the case study method is used to 
separately analyze the aforementioned insurgent groups.  The case studies use a five-part 
framework adapted from the separate works of Tilly and Spears to evaluate the extent to 
which each proto-state has developed: 
1. Territory: 40 The proto-state’s boundaries, the areas it actually controls. 
2. Coercive activities:  The extent to which the proto-state carries out each of 
these four.  “i. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the 
territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force.  ii. State 
making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories.  iii. Protection: 
Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients. iv. Extraction: Acquiring the 
means of carry out the first three activities – war making, state making, and protection.”41 
3. Identity and Legitimacy:42 The identities of the proto-state inhabitants (how 
they see themselves), and to what extent the coercive activities and structure of the proto-
state are viewed as legitimate. 
4. Political Goals and other Motivations:43  The proto-state leadership objectives, 
and the motivations of the various actors that make up the proto-state. 
5.  Organization and Structure: The character of the administrative apparatus of 
the proto-state, the extent to which bureaucracy has developed (if any).  This also 
includes the existing unofficial structures such as tribal hierarchies, feudalistic landowner 
arrangements, and informal financial networks that may function as enablers or inhibitors 
of proto-state development. 
Finally, the two proto-states are compared and contrasted within the same five-
category framework used in the case studies.  The units of comparison are the Taliban 
from 2001-2008, and the UWSP from 1990-2008.  
                                                 
40 These framework headings closely mirror Ian Spears’ work in: Spears, “States-Within-States: An 
Introduction to Their Empirical Attributes,” 19-29. 
41 Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” 181. 
42 Spears, 22. 
43 Ibid, 27. 
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Primary sources for this thesis include interviews with intelligence analysts, State 
Department officials working in the case study countries, academics, security forces in 
Southeast Asia, members of opposition groups in one case study country, and 
government and non-government agency employees working in or from the case study 
countries.  Written primary sources include policy documents of the United States 
Government and the case study country governments obtained from Internet websites.  
Secondary sources include scholarly books and journal articles, journalistic books, 
newspaper articles, official government documents, private and non-government 
organization reports, and United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II looks at the Golden Crescent 
region of Afghanistan-Pakistan, and addresses two major sub-questions: How does 
insurgency create drug-funded proto-states in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and how do 
geographic, political, socio-cultural, and economic elements shape these insurgencies?  
The chapter is divided into three sections.  The Background section details the 
geography, climate and political history of opium in the region and specifically in 
Afghanistan-Pakistan.  The Culture section examines how ethno-nationalism, concepts of 
states and borders, and tribal characteristics relate to the creation of proto-states funded 
by the drug trade.  The third section is the Taliban case study, using the methodology 
already discussed.  The chapter concludes by summarizing its findings.  Chapter III is 
devoted to the Golden Triangle and Burma.  It asks the two major sub-questions: How 
does insurgency create drug-funded proto-states in Burma, and how do geographic, 
political, socio-cultural, and economic elements shape these insurgencies?  It contains the 
same three sections as Chapter II, but the case study is on the UWSP.  Chapter IV is the 
comparative analysis portion of the thesis.  Using the methodology already discussed, it 
compares the Taliban and the UWSP point by point, with particular attention to how 
goals and motivations changed over time.  Chapter V, the conclusion, summarizes the 
key findings, ventures policy recommendations and suggests areas for further research. 
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II. THE GOLDEN CRESCENT: AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to get wrapped up in news reports proclaiming Afghanistan a narco-state 
(with a gross domestic product derived primarily from illicit drug trade), and the current 
Taliban movement as a band of narco-terrorists, or at the very least, narco-insurgents 
with the ability to seek refuge and regroup in the “lawless” border regions of western 
Pakistan.  It is also easy, as is the tendency of the press and many policy-makers, to blend 
the insurgency and narcotics problems together, which results in broad solutions with 
false expectations of quick success.  Thus far, the policies do not appear to be working: 
opium production has skyrocketed, and the Taliban insurgency continues to grow in 
scope and influence. 
As discussed in Chapter I, the viewpoint of this thesis is that in contrast to 
studying the problem as counter-narcotics/counterinsurgency issue, a state-building 
approach–that takes into account distinct socio-cultural characteristics–offers a deeper 
and more complete method of analysis.  With this in mind, the primary questions 
addressed by this chapter are two:  How does insurgency create drug-funded proto-states 
in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region? And, how do geography, socio-cultural 
characteristics and the opium industry contribute to proto-state formation?  An initial and 
important aspect of the argument presented here is that insurgents cannot be separated 
from the proto-states in and out of which they operate.  In fact, the words insurgent” and 
“insurgency” are highly charged and misleading terms.  Governments and states, whether 
legitimate or not, typically brand armed opposition groups with this moniker in a political 
attempt to detract from these groups’ legitimacy.  In this way, perhaps the very first part 
of a counterinsurgency strategy involves naming the group in question an “insurgent” 
organization, therefore defining the enemy.  Governments want other governments, and 
the people, to see their enemies as illegitimate groups seeking to break away from, gain 
concessions from, or overthrow the legitimate regime in power. 
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To answer these two questions, the beginning of this chapter describes the 
geography, climate and historical background of the opium trade and conflict in the 
Golden Crescent.  This backdrop shows that the war economy helped grow the nascent 
opium trade. The next section looks at the major non-economic proto-state enablers 
(which ironically, at the same time, slow or prevent the proto-state’s progression to full 
statehood).  It addresses the historical reasons why the Pashtuns in general (the ethnic 
group from which the insurgents mostly come) question the legitimacy of the states 
ensconced at Kabul and Islamabad.  Two of the key proto-state enablers identified here 
are the ethno-nationalistic concept of Pashtunistan and the Pashtun cultural sense of 
space.  This section also looks at what political structures exist among the Pashtuns in the 
absence of state power extending from these two cities into tribally or strongman-
organized territories. The socio-cultural concepts qawm (solidarity groups), and rutbavi 
(hierarchical) social organization enable the creation of the proto-state both politically 
and economically, but are not causal factors. The last section is a case study of the 
Taliban, analyzed according to the five-part framework outlined in Chapter I.  The case 
study shows that since 2001, the Taliban have organized a still disjointed proto-state that 
spans the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, funding its coercive forces and 
fledgling infrastructure increasingly through the opium industry (but also through money 
from abroad). 
B. BACKGROUND ON THE GOLDEN CRESCENT OPIUM TRADE 
1. Geography and Climate 
Papaver somniferum, the opium poppy, is a resilient plant that in ancient times 
grew only in the Mediterranean Region.  For a variety of reasons, over many centuries, it 
spread throughout Asia.  Now, opium crops can be found in a “distinctive Asian ‘opium 
zone’ that stretch(es) for 5,000 miles across the continent’s mountain rim.” 44  This zone 
begins in Turkey, and runs east through Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma, 
Thailand, and ends in Laos.  In the Golden Crescent, it is grown at both high (rarely 
                                                 
44 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 3. 
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higher than 2,500 meters) and low elevations (best results less than 1,500 meters).  High 
altitude spring crops are harvested in June and July.  Low altitude winter crops are 
harvested in April and May.  The opium poppy’s typical growing season is approximately 
120 days. 45 
2. Historical Backdrop of Opium and Conflict 
The British Empire’s wide involvement in the opium trade (not to leave out the 
Dutch, the Portuguese and the Americans) is regarded as a primary contributor to the 
reason why opium production changed in south and east Asia from small amounts being 
grown for medicinal purposes, to a large-scale legal trade that addicted millions of 
people.  India, which had grown the crop in smaller quantities under the Mughals, was 
the main supplier. China was the main importer. The British fought two wars with China, 
in part to force her to continue buying opium from them.  China also ended up producing 
its own massive crop.46 
The first time Afghanistan appeared as a major opium producer was in the 1950s, 
when a ban on opium crops in Iran created a large supply need.  Indeed, as McCoy notes: 
“Turkey and Afghanistan produced smoking opium for the near insatiable demand among 
the million plus opium smokers of Iran, which became, after the Chinese revolution, the 
world's leading opium consumer.”47  In the 1960s, under pressure from Nixon and the 
U.S., Turkey too cut down on its production.  This only further stimulated production in 
the eastern Golden Crescent and elsewhere.  So began the Cold War era, during which 
spin-off conflicts stimulated supply and demand of opium and its products throughout the 
world. 
From 1970-1978, Pakistan and Afghanistan continued to grow opium crops 
chiefly for consumers in Iran.  There was some international notice during this time, 
                                                 
45 Thomas Johnson, class notes from Contemporary Afghanistan Politics, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, Summer 2007.  See also the Senlis Council, 
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/events/kabul/haverkort_slides (accessed January 7, 2008). 
46 Martin Booth, Opium: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996), 107-144. 
47 Alfred McCoy, “Opium History Up To 1858 A.D.,” http://opioids.com/opium/history/index.html 
(accessed January 12, 2008). 
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primarily from western user types that realized the easy and cheap availability of the 
drug. A small population of these types congregated in Kabul, and though the Afghan 
government eventually forced them out, the trafficking connections they created with the 
West later became important.  Turkey’s policy of poppy-field destruction contributed to 
increased production in Afghanistan during the 1970s, but Pakistan led Afghanistan in 
opium production during this period. 48  However, none of these influences put the region 
on the map yet as a major opium producer.  At this time, the Golden Triangle produced a 
lot more of the drug due in large part to U.S. military-political-economic involvement in 
Southeast Asia.49 
However, the mid 1970s saw the beginning of the Golden Triangle’s decline for a 
variety of reasons.  Anti-drug operations (primarily in Thailand), new communist 
governments in Laos and Vietnam disrupting traditional trafficking routes, and a long 
Southeast Asia drought from the late 1970s to the early 1980s contributed to a decrease in 
supply.  Without a corresponding decrease in demand, simple economics dictated that the 
supply be made up elsewhere: this time in the Golden Crescent.50  Followers of world 
opium production have long observed how suppression in one area only leads to it 
increasing in another area.  This “balloon effect” is readily observable in the back and 
forth supply shifts between the Triangle, Crescent and other areas over the past fifty 
years.  
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 caused another significant shift in the world’s 
opium production.  The new government removed the Shah’s anti-drug program, limited 
though it had been, and both supply and demand in Iran rose dramatically.  Now that Iran 
did not need opium from Afghanistan and Pakistan, international networks came in and 
                                                 
48 Ikramul Haq, “Pak-Afghan Trade in Historical Perspective,” Asian Survey 36, no. 10 (Oct., 1996): 
948-949. 
49 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 285. 
50 Haq, 949. 
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started exporting it to Europe.51  There was also an exodus of Iranian “heroin chemists,” 
many who reopened for business in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP).52 
Then came another earth-shattering event: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
Afghan War.  By 1980, the opium trade took off after a short period of suppression when 
the Soviet army first entered the country.  Haq writes: 
…Afghan narcotics traders were confronted by a radically transformed 
international market.  Shorn from the Iranian market and with years of 
record crops behind them, Afghan traffickers soon learned to refine opium 
into heroin and discovered new outlets in Europe and North America.  The 
latter was usually accomplished through Pakistani middlemen, especially 
in the United States, Canada, and Germany.53 
Indirectly and with the full knowledge of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the mujahadeen used opium as an additional 
source of funding.  Pakistan quickly acquired the status of the world’s number one heroin 
supplier.54  The number of heroin addicts in Pakistan skyrocketed.  One report put the 
number at 1.3 million addicts by 1985.55  (At the time, Pakistan’s population numbered 
about 95 million.56) 
In the early 1990s, the Golden Crescent eclipsed the Golden Triangle as the 
world’s leading producer of opium,57 and heroin labs formerly based in the NWFP 
relocated into Afghanistan’s northeast due to Kabul’s crackdown in response to U.S. 
pressure.58  This opiate boom occurred in large part due to the 1994-2001 rise and rule of 
                                                 
51 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 471. 
52 Amir Zada Asad and Robert Harris, The Politics and Economics of Drug Production on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Border (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 123. 
53 Haq, 949. 
54 Alfred W. McCoy, “Coercion and its Unintended Consequences: A Study of Heroin Trafficking in 
Southeast and South West Asia,” Crime, Law and Social Change 33 (2000): 209. 
55 Haq, 954. 
56 Abdul Razzaque Rukanuddin and Tauseef Ahmed, “Introduction,” in Pakistan Demographic and 
Health Survey 1990-91 (Islamabad: National Institute of Population Studies, 1991), 3. 
57 McCoy, “Coercion and its Unintended Consequences,” 212. 
58 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 509. 
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the Pashtun Taliban: a group supported extensively by Pakistan.  Under the Taliban, 
opium production grew as they captured more poppy-growing territory–most 
significantly Helmand province–that they taxed to fund their campaigns.  They also taxed 
heroin production that took place around Jalalabad.  By the end of the 1990s, the business 
was booming, affecting every one of Afghanistan’s neighbors.59 
The past seven years saw the U.S. invasion and NATO occupation of Afghanistan 
and the emergence of the fledgling Karzai government.  After a sharp drop in opium 
production in 2001 (see Table 1 below) due to a highly publicized Taliban-led eradication 
effort, opium production in Afghanistan rose every year. 
 
Table 1.   Golden Crescent Potential Opium Production in Metric Tons (After: 
World Drug Report 2007, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) 
The year 2007 was a banner year.  Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the 
world’s opium.60  The spillover affect in neighboring countries has been massive.  For 
example, in 2004, a Pakistan domestic survey estimated that there were between “3.5 
million and five million habitual…drug takers…The overall prevalence, expressed in 
terms of the whole population, is roughly a third of one percent – a ratio that is among the 
most severe anywhere in the world.”61 
Divided and reluctant in regard to the opium problem, members of the 
international community involved in Afghanistan’s state-building, in conjunction with the 
fledgling Kabul government, made sporadic and unsuccessful attempts to curb the crop.  
                                                 
59 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 33 and 123.  
McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 509. 
60 Afghanistan 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey: Executive Summary, iv.  
61 Peter Chalk and C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan Tackles Impact of Afghan Opium Trade,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, March 01, 2005, 2, http://search.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2008). 
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Afghanistan 350 875 1120 1200 1570 1980 1970 2330 3416 2335 2248
Pakistan  130 120 130 149 150 160 181 161 128 112 24
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Afghanistan 2804 2693 4565 3276 185 3400 3600 4200 4100 6100 8200




Pressure mounted as yearly UNODC opium reports since 2002 showed ever-increasing  
poppy production.  By spring 2007, many believed opium to be as big a problem as the 
resurgent Taliban,62 if not more so, and controversy raged over the proper counter-
narcotic strategy to be employed. 
Clearly the drug trade in the Golden Crescent far predates the Taliban, and clearly 
the Taliban have other sources of funding.63  However, the drug networks are now firmly 
entrenched after thirty years of development, following millennia-old smuggling and 
trade routes. (See Figure 1 below.)  The UNODC estimates that 52 percent of 
Afghanistan’s opiates exit into Iran.  Thirty-three percent follows the two main routes 
into Pakistan: Jalalabad-Peshawar-Islamabad-Lahore and into India in the north, and 
through Kandahar-Quetta-Karachi in the south and then overseas.  The remaining 15 
percent goes north, mostly into Tajikistan.  If heroin alone is considered, the bulk (48 
percent) passes through Pakistan, as it has for the past three decades.64   Others believe 
that a higher percentage of heroin goes out through Iran, or into southern Pakistan and 
then into Iran.  There is also evidence that an increasing percentage of the trade in opiates 
from northern Afghanistan crops moves out through Tajikistan, where Russian mafia 





                                                 
62 James Risen, “Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghanistan War,” The New York Times, May 
16, 2007, Section A. 
63 See the following piece for a complete discussion: Thomas H. Johnson, “Financing Afghan 
Terrorism: Thugs, Drugs, and Creative Movements of Money,” in Terrorism Financing and State 
Responses: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas 94-113 (Palo Alto, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
64 World Drug Report 2007, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (United Nations Publication, 
August 1, 2007), 45, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2007.html (accessed 
February 2, 2008). 
65 U.S. Narcotics Analyst, Personal Interview, September 2007.  See also: Barnett R. Rubin, “The 
Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan,” World Development 28, no. 10 (October 2000): 
1706. See also: Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, “Opiate Smuggling Routes from Afghanistan to Europe and Asia,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 01, 2003, http://www.pa-chouvy.org/JIR3.htm (accessed March 18, 
2008).   
 22




This is the setting of the Golden Crescent proto-state, but the geographical, 
historical and political background is only part of the complete picture.  To understand its 
local structure, one must examine some important ethnic and cultural nuances of the 
region. 
C. PROTO-STATE ENABLERS 
1. The Durand Line, Ethno-nationalism and Colonial Legacy 
No discussion of proto-state development in the Golden Crescent can ignore the 
difference between the line drawn on a map between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the 
reality on the ground.  This largely notional boundary is the Durand Line. It was a 
boundary agreed upon by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan and the British in 
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1893, and named after British India foreign secretary at the time, Sir Mortimer Durand.  
At the time, it marked the “border” between Afghanistan and British India, and later 
became the basis for the “official” border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  It cuts 
through the traditional territories of the Pashtuns and Baluchis, and so to many of the 
people who actually live there, it is but an arbitrary line on a map.66   
The Durand Line has never been recognized as the official border by any Afghan 
government.  In the areas adjacent to the Line, as Roy writes: “the idea of the nation-state 
has given way to tribal and Islamic entities, which are more susceptible to Islamic 
revivalism, transformation of the tribal system…and the development of the drugs 
trade.”67  In what direction is this “transformation of the tribal system” is headed?  That 
is where the idea of the proto-state gains relevance for describing what political structure 
exists in the absence of real control emanating from Kabul and Islamabad. 
The formation of the proto-state in this core tribal area is enabled by an ethno-
nationalist movement incited by the drawing of the Durand Line at the end of the British 
colonial era in South Asia.  This movement, though seemingly intermittent during the 
past 50 years, is also one of many factors contributing to the instability in which the drug 
trade thrives. 
Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, which contains an estimated 25 million 
ethnic Pashtuns,68 the “Pashtunistan” idea has persisted with varying strength on both 
sides of the Durand Line.  At that time, many Pashtun leaders on the east side of the Line 
did not want their region to be part of Pakistan.  Rumblings about Pashtunistan from the 
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Kabul government exacerbated the matter.69 (Pashtuns also represent 42 percent or 13.75 
million (the majority) of Afghanistan’s population,70 and they have traditionally ruled the 
country.)  This was particularly the case when Afghan Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud 
sent troops into the FATA area of Pakistan in 1961, and after returning to power 12 years 
later, revived the idea of “Pashtunistan.”71  (See one possible conception of Pashtunistan 
in Figure 2, below.) 
Figure 2.   Pashtunistan (From: Senlis Council, 
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/maps) 
 
Since Daoud’s time, throughout the wars and conflicts that have gripped the 
region, this nationalism sentiment remained in the background, but was not forgotten.  In 
Pakistan, not that long after the Red Mosque incident in summer 2007, a Pashtun suicide 
bomber (a military officer) invoked “nationalist slogans” before killing 19 military 
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officers.72  In Afghanistan, Giustozzi notes that Pashtun nationalism is particularly strong 
in the “south-east” and in “Nangarhar province,” where in some cases Pashtun tribes 
straddle the Durand Line.73 
Pashtun nationalist movements have been intermittent and persuasive only to 
some of the population, which begs a better description or different approach for 
understanding the Pashtun mindset.  Allan offers that the concept of “an indigenous folk 
territory…means little to Pashtuns; they are an ethnic group that traverses and establishes 
long distance links of their kinship through space.”74  This mindset lends itself well to all 
sorts of trade.  He believes that although certain aspects of Pashtun culture are not causal 
factors in the opium trade, “…placelessness, ethnic fidelity, and long-distance trading 
networks, underpin the cultivation and distribution of opium outside of Afghanistan into 
adjacent regions.”75  While this concept of space may apply to the Pashtun economic 
outlook and provide a ready-made network for the initial movement and processing of 
opium, it does not seem to apply to those Pashtun who believe that there is a proper 
Pashtun territory or homeland.  It appears that there are two forces at work, one unifying 
and one fragmentary.  Pashtun ethno-nationalism fosters the possibility of a Pashtun 
proto-state, while the Pashtun concept of territory at a more basic tribal level attributes 
little meaning to borders. 
Another ethnic-nationalist movement, that of the Baluchi, is not the main focus of 
this thesis, but needs mention because the Taliban operate in some of the same areas.  
The Baluchi population is divided among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.  Like the 
Pashtuns, when Pakistan became independent, some Baluchis led by the ruler of a 
princely state called Kalat declared independence.  Pakistan, through military might and 
winning over key Baluchi leaders, crushed this movement.  Since then, various separatist 
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movements have kept up the fight in low-intensity insurgencies that benefit from 
inhospitable terrain, smuggling, and a porous border with Afghanistan. 76  Baluchistan 
borders on Helmand, the largest opium-producing province in Afghanistan. 
One final related issue is Islamabad’s use of a remnant of British colonial policy 
to deal with the majority of the Pashtun-populated region on its side of the Durand Line.  
In its early years, the Pakistan government (at that time in Karachi) kept in place the 
British system of administration for the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) by 
actually formalizing it in its Constitution.77  This document states in Article 223 that:  
“No Central Law shall apply to a Tribal Area or to any part of a Tribal Area unless the 
President so directs, and no Provincial Law shall apply to a Tribal Area or to any part of a 
Tribal Area unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal Area is situated, with 
the approval of the President, so directs.”78  The Constitution further states that no courts, 
to include the Supreme Court, have jurisdiction in the Tribal areas.79  This has direct 
ramifications for the drug trade, given that a main smuggling route as shown above 
(Kandahar-Quetta-Karachi) passes directly through the FATA and NWFP (as shown on 
Figure 1, above).  So even when Islamabad chooses to confront drug trafficking or 
production in these areas, it has only weak official state judicial mechanisms to enforce 
its will.  More importantly, the autonomous nature of the region is built officially into the 
structure of Pakistan governance.  Where no “Central Law” or “Provincial Law” exists, 
other tribal political / structures far older fill the vacuum, or new structures develop such 
as warlords or the proto-state. 
2. Tribal Factors and Feudalism 
Goodhand discusses the concept of Afghanistan’s “borderlands” wherein 
“warlords compete with one another and embryonic central authority to establish their 
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own regional ‘mini-states’.”80   These mini- or proto-states, if one hearkens back once 
more to Tilly, lie somewhere between “households and kinship groups” and the nation-
state.81  In other words, the proto-state is feudalistic in nature, but not in the traditional 
European model.  In most cases, the term “feudalism” in Pashtun lands applies more the 
economics than it does political structure.  This section analyzes the character of Pashtun-
style feudalism.   
Tribal organization in some forms and contexts is an enabler for the proto-state.  
Before this statement can be further pursued, however, a basic discussion of Pashtun 
tribal leadership structure and society is necessary.  Where the traditional tribal structure 
is still present, it is generally organized as follows.  At the village level there are elders 
called maliks or arbabs with limited powers for solving disputes among the up to seventy 
men that they oversee.  The khans are one level up, with larger numbers of people for 
whom they are responsible and sources of capital under their control.  The khans 
interface with other khans and officials of the Kabul government or other power 
structures, if any are present.  The decisions of these tribal leaders at both levels are 
subject to the approval of jirgas, or tribal councils.82 
This system is organized according to Pashtunwali: a code that governs traditional 
Pashtun society.  It is this code that fills the vast gap between the miniscule area of the 
Pashtun region actually governed by Kabul and Islamabad, and it has been around for 
much longer period of time.  As Johnson and Mason write: 
Pashtunwali is neither the absence of governance, nor summary judgment, 
nor a lynch mob at work.  Rather, it is an alternative form of social 
organization with an advanced conflict resolution mechanism that does not 
involve court houses, jails, lawyers, law schools, bailiffs, county clerks, 
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prisons, prison guards, judges, or policemen.  It has been estimated that 
jirgas resolve 95 percent of the cases in which they are invoked.83 
Where one falls within the tribe is called nikat, which is established at birth.  
From the individual, one’s network of loyalty extends first to the family, then the 
extended family, and then the tribe. 84  These systems of loyalty are referred to as qawm, 
which Rubin defines as a solidarity group whose composition and extent varies from area 
to area.85  Many scholars have commented on qawm’s impact on modern Afghan society 
from a variety of different angles, including the economics of its patronage networks, as 
they exist differently for different Pashtun tribes.86  Along these same lines, this thesis 
posits that it is qawm upon which a large part of the proto-state economic structure exists 
today.  Goodhand provides an example: “For instance, today’s drugs, smuggling and 
religious networks draw upon pre-war social networks based on qawm and tribal 
loyalties.  Warlords and profiteers play new games by old rules, mobilizing the ‘economy 
of affection’, just as other rulers have throughout Afghan history.”87  In what different 
forms does qawm manifest, and does it play a part in proto-state formation? 
To answer these questions one might look to the degree of  “hierarchization” 
present in poppy cultivating areas.  Giustozzi and Ullah offer an analysis of two 
anthropologists’ (Akbar S. Ahmed and I. E. Katkov) views on Pashtun social 
organization.  They note two organization types: “Nang…the honour-bound Pashtuns, 
who still abide by the tribal code (Pashtunwali) in full and whose society is acephalous 
and segmentary,” and “Galang…characterized by a hierarchical social structure, where 
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Pashtunwali plays a more modest role and where patron-client relations are dominant.”88  
They go on to detail Katkov’s observations on Pashtun tribes, which he divides into three 
types, (two of which are virtually the same as Achmed’s): 1. “qaumi – egalitarian”, 2. 
“rutbavi – hierarchical, with tendency towards feudalization”, 3. “kuchi-nomadic and 
very egalitarian.”89  All of these forms of social organization possess networks based on  
qawm, though warlords are more likely to arise from the rutbavi tribes.90  The next step is 
to apply this analysis in some specific areas to see if cash cropping of opium is related in 
any way to the rutbavi structure. 
Looking at the two primary opium-producing provinces of the present and past 
(Helmand and Nangarhar)91 reveals that the galang or rutbavi social organization 
happens to be more prevalent.  (This is discussed more below.) If opium is currently an 
economic pillar of rutbavi tribal leaders, it provides a ready-made means for proto-state 
capital extraction. In addition, both of these provinces border areas of Pakistan across 
which qawm extends, making for easy transit of drugs and the chemicals needed to 
produce heroin. 
In this context, Nangarhar and Helmand Provinces are now examined in more 
detail.  In Nangarhar, opium production in 2007 occurred in the tribal areas as seen in 
Figure 3 below.  Various tribes are involved, but overall, no one tribal area outstripped 
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Figure 3.   Nangahar Province Tribal Areas and Opium Production in 2007 (After: Map- 
Afghanistan Immediate Needs Project, Nangahar USAID/DAI; Opium Data- 
UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey, 2007) 
 
 
The majority of Pashtuns in Nangarhar province are of the Sarbani clan, beneath 
which are many individual tribes.  As can be seen from the red and purple triangles on the 
map, the Mohmands, Khogianis, and Khulozais participate heavily in poppy farming.  
The Shenwari are not increasing their cultivation this year except in their easternmost 
area.   
Is there something about the makeup of these tribes that enables opium 
cultivation, or are other factors at play?  Mansfield states that: “While geography is an 
important factor in determining the different livelihood options available in an area, 
ultimately it is the portfolio of assets and capabilities within each household that 
determines which particular opportunities are available to them…”  He goes on to point 
out that “It is not unusual to find 20-35 members per household in districts such as Achin, 










Shinwar and Pacha Wa Agam,” 92 which all happen to be situated in Nangarhar’s south 
where opium crops are so prevalent.  Many of these families own only very small tracts 
of land, and so grow opium to get the most out of their land and ensure they can feed all 
the mouths.  Families closer to Jalalabad, with larger plots of well-irrigated land, can 
subsist off of licit crops and plant opium poppy as insurance because they have more 
space.93 
This example, coupled with the fact that opium crops are grown by all the tribes 
residing in rural areas of the province, seem to point to the fact that it is not a tribal-based 
cultural preference for growing poppy, but an economic reason.  This may be true, but as 
Edwards points out from his Taliban-era research in Nangarhar:  
While a handful of dominant political leaders associated with the 
provincial shura governed these most lucrative (government) posts, there 
was a hierarchy of commanders just below them, some of whom exercised 
control over greater or lesser governmental posts and some of whom 
operated independently as local strongmen in their village or district.94 
This suggestion of a more hierarchical rutbavi structure at play in this province 
matches the evidence provided by Dorronsoro that shows the historical propensity for 
Nangarhar’s land-owning commanders to be involved in opium cultivation and its 
movement into Pakistan via tribal links.95  Rutbavi does not appear to be a cause of the 
opium production, but there is a correlation. 
In turning to Helmand province, one sees that generally it has been Afghanistan’s 
top opium producer since the early 1990s.  As evident in Figure 4 below, opium 
production is expected to increase all throughout Helmand in 2007. 
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Figure 4.   Helmand Province Tribal Areas and Opium Production in 2007 (After: 
“Tribes and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan 1980-2005,” Antonio Giustozzi, 
Crisis States Research Centre; Opium Data- UNODC Afghanistan Opium Rapid 
Assessment Survey, 2007.) 
 
 
In appears that the Ghilzai minority and the Durrani (Alizai, Noorzai, Alokozai, 
Ehsaqzai, Popolzai, Achakzai and Barakzai) majority all participate in opium production.  
There is a strong similarity to the Nangarhar pattern discussed earlier.  Mansfield points 
out that in the northern districts of Helmand (Durrani), where landholdings are small, 
larger percentages of land are used to cultivate poppy.  In the central part of the province, 
landholdings are bigger and have better access to water.96 
Therefore, similar to Nangarhar, poppy farming appears to have stronger linkages 
to poverty than it does to any particular clan or tribe.  Also present in both provinces, is 
the rutbavi or hierarchical-feudalistic structure that Giustozzi and Ullah write: 
“sometimes even lead(s) to creation of states” when a unifying force such as a warlord 
comes along. 97 This thesis argues that the Taliban are one such unifying force.  
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Helmand’s recent history bears out the relationship between tribal commanders and the 
opium trade, who since the 1980s have taxed it and provided security, much as the 
Taliban are doing now.  As far as the opium-export system is concerned, there is a 
difference from Nangarhar’s qawm-based system in which the same Pashtun tribe (the 
Shenwari)98 lives on both sides of the Durand Line.  In Helmand, it is Baluchi smugglers 
(with tribal ties in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan) that move opium across international 
borders,99 so an inter-ethnic linkage (Pashtun to Baluchi) has developed to facilitate 
medium-ranged trade in this area. 
D. CASE STUDY: THE TALIBAN 
Until now, this chapter has discussed enabling factors for proto-state 
development.  This section looks at an organization, the Taliban as it currently exists, and 
evaluates according the characteristics of a proto-state.  The Taliban passed through 
many phases since its birth as an organization in the early 1990s:  from an ISI-supported, 
anti-mujahadeen warlord army, to the autonomous rulers of most of Afghanistan, to an 
“insurgent group” fighting a International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and United 
States backed state in Kabul.  While the conventional view is that the current iteration of 
the Taliban is an Islamic insurgency, this case study attempts to view it through a state-
building lens.   
1. Territory 
It is difficult to define the boundaries of a possible Taliban proto-state due to the 
warfare that grips the region and lack of reliable information.  In addition, as in any state-
like entity, the degree of control and organizational structure varies throughout the 
claimed territory.  Figure 5 represents one effort at depicting the Taliban presence.  Their 
primary area lies inside the heavy black line, and note also the areas of highest opium 
production.   
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Figure 5.   Taliban Presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (After: Senlis Council, 




To evaluate this territory as a proto-state, one must look for the Taliban-controlled 
areas where, as put by Giustozzi and Ullah, “it is possible to speak of a tendency towards 
feudalization, such as the increasing reliance on dependent sharecroppers as a source of 
revenue and power.”100  This can be seen in the “permanent” Taliban presence in the 
primary opium-producing (and Pashtun) areas as depicted in the above Figure, much of 
which lie in and adjacent to Helmand province, and to a lesser extent Nangarhar, as 
discussed in the last Section.  (Of note: According to the UNODC World Drug Report 
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2007: “In Pakistan, where opium poppy is grown in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, 
the Government reported a 59 per cent reduction of opium poppy cultivation bringing the 
total to just 1,545 ha.”101  One must ask how the Islamabad government can accurately 
report on opium production in an area it does not even control, and barely maintains a 
presence.) 
The most defining measure of the proto-state’s territory must be, however, the 
extent to which it legitimately dominates its population.102  On the map above, this is 
depicted by the Taliban Core, which has been named The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan 
by Taliban commanders, and lately fallen under the control of an alliance of Taliban 
commanders called the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan under Baitullah Mehsud.103  Whereas 
ISAF forces can move through most areas in Afghanistan (though they may be attacked 
by the Taliban or other groups), the Pakistani Army is essentially denied the ability to 
project power into much of the FATA.  From this Core area, and other smaller areas 
along the Durand Line, the Taliban conduct many proto-state activities and launch 
operations into other areas, as discussed below. 
2. Coercive Activities 
a. War Making 
The Taliban clearly conducts war against NATO, United States, Kabul, 
and intermittently against Islamabad.  The line between its war making (use of force to 
defeat enemies outside its borders) and state making activities (defeating enemies within) 
is not easy to discern for the very reasons discussed in the Territory Section.  In the terms 
of the proto-state definition, it has not fully monopolized the use of force in the areas in 
operates, and one of its objectives is to expand its territory.  Its forces for carrying out 
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both war making and state making activities are estimated at the low end “between 7,000 
and 12,000 men,”104 and at the high end 17,000 in Afghanistan and 40,000 in Pakistan.105  
b. State Making 
Under this category of coercion, which refers to the elimination of internal 
rivals to power, the Taliban is active in stamping out local opposition.  In the FATA, for 
example, it has slain “…more than 150 pro-government maliks, or tribal elders…” from 
2003-2008.106  During the same time period, in southeast Afghanistan, the killing of 
“pro-government mullahs” was commonplace, as was the execution of central 
government officials.107  Where tribal structures do not support it, it seeks to eliminate 
the tribal structures.  In some areas, tribal structures are conducive to its extraction 
activities, which may influence its approach for bringing those areas under its sway. 
c. Protection 
Protection is the “elimination or neutralization of the enemies of (one’s) 
clients.”108  This helps to build support and legitimacy.  The Taliban protects farmers’ 
opium crops by killing or scaring away Kabul eradication teams.  It protects the 
transportation of illicit crops and other trade goods, and the operation of heroin labs.  In 
some areas it sets up courts to mete out justice according to its interpretation of Sharia 
law, and settles the disputes of people.109 
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d. Extraction 
The Taliban’s war making, as for any such group, necessitates the raising 
of capital, and raising capital means using force to hold on to sources of capital.  
Although it has external sources of revenue, taxing the drug trade appears to be of 
growing importance for lining its coffers.  According to one analyst: 
All poppy farmers pay a poppy tax called 'usha' to the local mayor or 
malik.  This is about 10% of their profits after the harvesters have taken 
their cut (the harvesters take 25% of the opium they harvest- and in many 
cases they will harvest everything for the farmer, so that amounts to 25% 
of everything).  We do know that in the south of Afghanistan the Taliban 
are forcibly taking half of the poppy tax that is collected. (Kandahar, 
Helmand, Nimroz, Zabul and southern Urozgan)  This amounted to $25m 
last year...and if you add in $3m from eastern Farah, the grand total that 
we know of last year was about $26m.  All indicators are that this year the 
cultivation levels in the south are the same as last.  So, in two years over 
$50m will be available but, and this is key, this is ready money, available, 
on the spot, right here and right now as it is kept in biscuit (cookie to you!) 
tins under people's beds.  A lot of money to buy bullets and pay tier 3 
Taliban salaries (as much as $5 per day?).110 
This is only one means of extraction related to the drug trade.  The Taliban are now 
known to tax virtually every step in the process.  There is a 15 percent tax on heroin 
laboratories, a 15 percent tax on “transit,” and an 18-20 percent protection tax paid by 
traffickers.111  Aside from its extractive capabilities, the Taliban also draw upon financial 
support from Islamic charities that funnel money from throughout world through the 
Hawala networks.  Much of this comes in to the Pakistan tribal areas, and then into 
Afghanistan.112  It is therefore important, as many have noted, that elimination of opium 
will not hamstring the Taliban.  However, controlling areas that grow opium cash crops 
provides a starting point for consolidating a geographical base that is self-sustaining.  
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3. Identity and Legitimacy 
The Taliban occupy territory under several different guises, some of the most 
prominent names being: the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Islamic Emirate of 
Waziristan, and the lately founded, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.113  Despite these 
differences, it is important to understand, as Niazi writes: “…that the Taliban on both 
sides of the Durand Line, which separated Pakistan from Afghanistan, pledge their 
allegiance to Mullah Omar.  As the Taliban do not recognize the Durand Line as an 
‘international border,’ it asserts its identity as Taliban, not as Afghan Taliban or Pakistani 
Taliban.”114   (It is important to note that there is substantial evidence that in the 
beginning of 2008, a fracture has occurred between the Taliban operating on either side 
of the Durand Line.  The ability of Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura to repair the 
damage is yet to be validated.)115 
Taliban identity is many-layered.  At its most basic root, the national identity of 
the Taliban proto-state is the ethnic Pashtun.  This is not to say that tribal and familial 
identity are not present and usually more important, but rather Pashtun identity is what 
connects the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan, even more deeply than Islamic 
religious identity.116  As already discussed, it common for many Pashtuns to not 
recognize the Durand Line as the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  For 
example, in a recent non-scientific survey of Taliban Pashtun soldiers, the belief was 
pervasive that western Pakistan belongs to Afghanistan, to include the FATA areas and 
Quetta.117 
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One level up from ethnic identity is religious identity.  While not all Pashtuns 
practice the same brand of Islam that the Taliban embrace, the shared Islamic roots are 
powerful.  The Taliban, especially the upper tiers, believe in Deobandi Islam, a South 
Asian conservative movement akin in many aspects to Wahhabism, that has over time 
taken on many aspects of Pashtunwali.118  While the leadership speaks the language of 
this ideology, using it to explain their political objectives, run Sharia courts, recruit for its 
army, and mobilize support, its translation and affect among the common folk is variable.  
As in any organization or institution, identity and worldview is not uniform at all levels.  
Peasant farmers in Taliban-controlled areas are like peasant farmers the world over: they 
want to maintain or improve their means of living so that they can feed their families and 
hopefully save a little extra money.  The basic foot soldier’s outlook is very similar in 
that one’s livelihood (often poppy farming) must be protected, and that family deaths due 
actions taken by foreigners and their puppet regimes must be avenged (part of the 
Pashtunwali code).  At this level, due to a lack of education, very little is known about the 
world or even the nature of the infidel enemy.  Knowing that they must fight the infidel, 
and that the ‘ulema support these actions, is enough for them.119 
Overall, Taliban legitimacy appears to be an initial state building stage reflective 
of Mao’s famous line: “Political power comes out of the barrel of gun.”120 In general, 
Taliban legitimacy is stronger where traditional structures have broken down, described 
by Roy as a phenomenon in which “tribal ideology” no longer has the ability “to shape 
social relations of people inside Afghanistan.”121   Its legitimacy is also stronger where 
Kabul’s influence is weak, and it can step in to enforce order and threaten or kill 
competitors.  In these cases, its legitimacy is based on it being the best of several 
undesirable alternatives. 
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In areas where it has been more successful, however, its legitimacy goes beyond 
just the threat of force.  Giustozzi argues that tribal leaders and Taliban gain legitimacy 
among the populace in different ways.  The Taliban use “religion/’ideology’ and skills in 
building bridges among local communities,” while tribal elders use residual tribal 
traditions, control over wealth/land and community management skills…”122  In this 
respect, the community-linking ability of the Taliban is much more a state-building force 
than the influence of the tribal elders, whose power is largely limited to their own 
families.123  Areas of weak tribal power are scattered throughout Pashtun lands, and 
correspond very closely with Taliban centers of power.  South Afghanistan, parts of 
southeast Afghanistan, and the NWFP and FATA areas of Pakistan all provide 
examples.124 
A final note must be made of the Taliban propaganda campaign, which is widely 
viewed by analysts as a sophisticated and effective as compared to that of its competitors, 
for strengthening its legitimacy among the populace.  It is extremely quick to pounce on 
the mistakes made by Kabul, Islamabad, and ISAF forces that result in the deaths of 
innocent civilians.  It also uses radio stations, compact disks, DVDs, VCDs, television, 
web sites and “night letters” to communicate its messages.  Taliban media is pervasive, 
culturally sensitive to its Pashtun audience, and a powerful tool eliciting desired behavior 
from those the organization is attempting to govern. 125 
4. Political Goals and other Motivations 
Considering the importance of the Taliban to the conflict in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, there is a surprising (or perhaps unsurprising) lack of discussion about its 
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political objectives.  Instead there is a lot of talk about its military strategy, but as 
students of Clausewitz know, one must look beyond just military strategy to what it is 
being used to accomplish.  In one sense, the political objectives of the Taliban seem 
relatively clear.  According to a 2005 document called the Constitution of the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan, approved by the Supreme Shura Council, the Taliban want to 
reinstitute a government similar to the one it was building prior to 2001.  Probably the 
most defining characteristic of this vision is contained in Article 5, which states: “The 
Islamic Sharia is the only source of lawmaking in the country, governing all aspects of 
individual and social life of the people in the light of life constructive teachings of Islam.  
Laws and resolutions should not be, in any way, contrary to religious provisions and 
foundations.”126  It is important to note that this objective cannot always be seen to 
directly correspond with actions taken on the ground, due to differing motivations at 
different levels of the organization, and the decentralized nature of its structure. 
To achieve this objective, the Taliban need a territory in which to train, regroup, 
re-supply and steadily expand its state building activities.  Based on this, strategic and 
political sub-objectives emerge.  The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) identifies three overarching Taliban goals: 1) “Defend the FATA,”  2) 
“Destabilize the Government of Pakistan,” and 3) “Defeat the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF).”  All three are required to clear the region of non-Islamic forces and institute the 
Constitution. 
5. Organization and Structure 
There are many different analyses of the Taliban structure due to lack of 
information and the fluid nature of warfare in the region.  For the most part, this section  
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used information from the CSIS Report referenced above, and the recent works of Hodes 
and Sedra, and Giustozzi for its assessment of the Taliban’s attempt at instituting a state-
like organization in its territory. 
It is generally agreed that leadership Shura of the Taliban is based in Quetta, with 
Mullah Omar as the supreme leader.  The Shura has had 10-33 members since its creation 
in 2003.  According to Hodes and Sedra, as late as 2007:   
From the Shura stem three military commands: one in Quetta, which runs 
operations in southern Afghanistan (Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and 
Farah); one in the NWFP capital Peshawar, which runs operations north of 
the Khyber Pass (in Jalalabad, Kunar, Logar and Laghman); and one in 
Miran Shah, the capital of North Waziristan, which oversees operations in 
the eastern provinces of Khost, Paktya and Paktika.127 
Within Afghanistan, this southern command is divided between a south and southeastern 
commander, and the Kabul region may have its own commander separate from the 
Peshawar command. This structure is not strictly hierarchical, nor is it set in stone.  
Several Taliban commanders have been killed, fired by Mullah Omar, or moved. 128   As 
mentioned above, the structure in Pakistan has been more fractious than usual since 
December 2007, and future relationship between the Quetta Shura and the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan. 
Below the regional commands are leaders at the province and district levels, and 
below these, “tactical commanders” with squad to platoon-sized elements.129  The 
Taliban are often divided into “tiers” for the purposes of describing recruitment and 
motivations in the organization:   
• Tier 1:  “Purely ideologically driven madrasa students.” 
• Tier 2: “…jihadist recruits provided by village mullahs…” 
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• Tier 3: This tier represents the base of support, the citizens of the proto-
state so to speak. “communities and opportunists” 
• Tier 4: “Mercenary elements.”130 
It is the members of these tiers that carry out the coercive activities outlined earlier, using 
existing cultural networks as needed, such as qawm and mullahs sympathetic to its cause. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter opened by describing a brief history of the opium trade in the Golden 
Crescent, showing that the drug business boom in Afghanistan is due to a wide variety of 
factors that significantly predate the Taliban.  Next, it delved into proto-state 
development enablers, such as the British colonial policy for the NWFP and FATA, 
which after being codified into law by Pakistan, essentially meant no governance of the 
region at all by Islamabad.  The Durand Line’s lack of impact as an international border 
was discussed, as was the nationalistic Pashtunistan concept as it affects politics and 
social mobilization.  Next, Pashtun tribal factors were examined in relation to the drug 
business.  A correlation between Rutbavi (hierarchical) tribal structure and opium cash 
cropping was identified, and qawm was discussed as an enabler for moving drugs 
internally through the region. 
Finally, the case study analyzed the Taliban according to the proto-state definition 
and framework elucidated in Chapter I.  This exercise showed that the Taliban possess 
many apparatuses of a proto-state, but structurally are still quite fragmented throughout 
the Golden Crescent region.  Its identity, motivations, and legitimacy are as uneven as the 
areas it controls, although in the south of Afghanistan, and especially in the FATA, it has 
established core territories.  Extraction of capital from the opium business has become a 
mainstay of its organization, and it exercises strong control over the highest producing 
areas for this cash crop.  This combination of controlled territory and a viable cash crop 
are the factors that stand out the most in viewing the Taliban as an evolving proto-state. 
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Since a strong central state never existed in this region, instead of looking at the 
conflict through an insurgency-counterinsurgency lens, it is much more useful to view it 
as a competition in state building.  In many ways, the Taliban appear to be ahead of 
Kabul.  The ultimate level of cohesion achievable by the Taliban, however, is 
questionable.  Under the obvious layer of Islam ideology that drives its actions, the 
Taliban is made up of Pashtuns.  As Johnson and Mason stress, “Pashtun tribal society 
is…inherently resistant to externally or internally imposed hierarchical order.”131  
Perhaps proto-state-ness is the greatest extent of state-building it can achieve while 
mobilized under a religious banner 
                                                 
131 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of Fire,” 62. 
 45
III. THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE: BURMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The “Golden Triangle,” consisting of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, is one of a few 
regions in the world where the “perfect storm” of ethnicity, opium, difficult terrain, and 
nationalism combine to create an environment ripe for drug-influenced politics and 
stubborn insurgencies.  While international political and media focus on the region has 
slowly faded, especially with the end of the Cold War and the rise of other conflicts, 
lessons can be drawn from the six decades-long conflict and illicit drug production and 
trafficking that still continues there.  Burma in particular remains a major source of 
Mainland Southeast Asia insecurity.  The spillover affects its low intensity conflict, such 
as illicit drugs, refugees, human trafficking, and refugees, remain a regional and 
international concern. 
As discussed in Chapter I, this thesis argues that a state-building approach is 
better for studying “insurgencies” in general, and especially conflicts with an apparent 
correlation with illicit drug production.  This approach must be tempered by an 
understanding the socio-cultural characteristics of the people involved in the conflict.  
The questions addressed here are similar in scope to those in Chapter II:  How does 
insurgency create proto-states in Burma?  And, how do geography, socio-cultural 
characteristics and the drug industry contribute to proto-state formation?  As stated earlier 
in this work, the word “insurgent” is a political term.  Using the state-building approach, 
this thesis prefers to look upon insurgents neutrally as the security and defense apparatus 
of the proto-state.  For many people living in the proto-state, these so-called insurgents 
are relied upon for protection and justice. 
To answer these two questions, this chapter beings by outlining the geography, 
climate and historical background of opium as it relates to conflict in the Golden 
Triangle.  This section will be somewhat longer than the similar section in Chapter II, 
because the large-scale drug production related to civil war has been going on in 
Southeast Asia for nearly twice as long as it has in the Golden Crescent.  Like the Golden 
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Crescent, a burgeoning war economy helped grow the trade in opiates and provided a 
source of funding for various armed groups fighting against the Burman state in 
Rangoon.  The next section looks at the major non-economic proto-state enablers, 
specifically in the Shan State, which is the predominant opium-growing area.  It 
addresses the historical, political and cultural reasons why ethnic groups in Burma’s 
opium-growing region have sought autonomy from the lowland Burman majority.  The 
key proto-state enablers identified here are divided into three categories.  The first is the 
British colonial legacy that left Burma with boundaries drawn around areas that had 
never really been part of the Kingdom of Burma, and a nationalist Burman majority with 
little desire to affect equitable political solutions with the multitude of ethnic minorities 
living in these areas.  The second enabler is described within very large category of 
ethno-nationalistic and communist driven conflict, and how it led to fragmented, largely 
autonomous enclaves throughout the Shan State that depended on opiate production and 
taxation of trade for capital (or just plain survival).  The third category of enablers is 
found within the socio-cultural realm.  Two main items are identified.  The first is gumsa 
as a feudal political and extraction system that provided a baseline structure that armed 
groups used for capital.  The second is the idea of guanxi (in its meaning as a relationship 
network in which people cooperate with each other for mutual gain), and its enabling of 
certain individuals that were either members of the armed groups or just allowed to 
operate in their areas, to construct loosely organized regional trafficking networks. 
The last section is a case study of the United Wa State Party (UWSP), one of 
many ethnic groups parties/militias in northeastern Burma, and probably the most 
successful in establishing its own proto-state in the region.  The same five-part 
framework outlined in Chapter I and applied to the Taliban in Chapter II is used here, but 
a more historical approach is used.  This is because the “Wa proto-state” is in a later stage 
of development compared to the “Taliban proto-state” (a much more nebulous and hotly 
contested entity).  The case study shows that the Wa leveraged their army, geography and 
opium production to secure a largely autonomous territory and a ceasefire with the 
Burmans. A key enabler in this process (in addition to the general enablers described in  
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the last paragraph) was and continues to be China’s foreign policy that sees Northeastern 
Burma as a “buffer state” for border security and a foothold for squeezing economic 
benefit out of its xenophobic neighbor. 
B. BACKGROUND ON THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE OPIUM TRADE 
1. Geography and Climate 
The bulk of Golden Triangle opium production has always occurred in Burma, 
and within Burma, predominantly in the Shan State (this chapter’s sub-region of focus).  
This area is situated on a plateau with its own system of valleys and hills separate from 
lowland Burma; it shares international borders with China, Laos and Thailand.  The 
Salween River, fed by the waters of the Himalayas, bisects the plateau.  Much of the 
terrain is heavily forested, and the hot, rainy climate of this tropical region (there is a 
short dry season) creates many challenges for its agrarian inhabitants.  Taken as a whole, 
it is an exceedingly difficult and unforgiving environment.   
Farmers who grow poppy in this area usually plant their fields at “300-800 meters 
elevation,” and due to the topography of the region, usually on the sides of hills.132  
These poppy farmers grow other crops as well, such as corn and rice.  The opium poppy 
(a relatively hardy plant) is usually planted as insurance, should other crops fail.  In 
Southeast Asia, it is planted in October or November, and harvested by February.133  
2. Historic Backdrop of Opium and Conflict 
While there is evidence that opium was present in Mainland Southeast Asia at 
least as early as the 1300s, it is unclear exactly when opium poppy farming first came to 
the highland area of the Golden Triangle.  Chinese-Muslim merchants–running mule 
trade-convoys from Yunnan to Siam–were probably the first to introduce it to tribes 
already dwelling in the remote hills and mountains.  Until the 19th century, it was 
                                                 
132 Ronald D. Renard, The Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs and the Making of the Golden Triangle 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 95. 
133 Entrance Exhibit, Hall of Opium tour, Golden Triangle Park, Thailand, February 2008. 
 48
predominantly grown for medicinal purposes, and in small quantities.  Migrations caused 
by conflict and population pressures in Yunnan during the 1800s, brought more hill tribes 
(the Hmong, Yao, Lisu, Kachin and Lahu among others) to the region.  Opium was a 
mainstay crop for these people, and they brought the seeds with them.134 
Groups already present, like the hill tribe Wa, Palaung, En and others, also began 
to cultivate opium more widely during the 1800s.  While these peoples were not the main 
source of opium in Southeast Asia during this time–most came from India, and hill-tribe 
crops were illegal due to the colonial and Siamese legal monopolies–the practice became 
well-entrenched and affected overall supply and prices in the opium market.135 
The British, French and Siamese at first suppressed Southeast Asia hill tribe 
opium crops to maintain a grip on their respective monopolies.  Political events in Siam 
changed this.  In 1932, a successful coup forced the Siamese King to abdicate and the 
new government implemented a constitutional monarchy.  After this, the Siamese 
military began to import much more opium from the hill tribe areas of Southeast Asia, to 
include tribes in Burma’s Shan State.136 
The next major opium production-increasing event occurred when World War II 
(WWII) trade route disruptions cut off the supply of opium flowing from Persia and India 
to Southeast Asia.  The French responded by forcing hill tribes in Indochina to increase 
production.137  The Thai solution involved the occupation of a part of Burma’s Shan 
plateau (with Japanese approval), as Wyatt writes: “This campaign may have been 
motivated by the Thai need to develop a new source of opium to replace opium 
previously obtained from British India.”138  
Despite these developments, Southeast Asia, to include Burma, was still not a 
major producer of opium prior to WWII.  Locals consumed the part of the crop not taken 
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by the Siamese or Chinese, and even used opium as a form of currency (an aspect 
exploited by American forces: some hill tribes in Burma fought against the Japanese for 
the United States in exchange for opium flown in from India).139  It took regional 
conflict, international geopolitics, and the “war on drugs” to make the Golden Triangle 
the center of a trade with lucrative profits that were once legal and the foundation of 
kingdoms and colonial empires. 
The real opium boom started soon after Burma gained its independence from the 
British in 1948.  Civil war almost immediately broke out in the former colony: a 
combination of ethnic groups fighting for states separate from a Burman-dominated state 
of which they had never been a part, and an even more threatening Communist 
opposition.  This situation was exacerbated by elements of the Chinese Kuomintang 
(KMT) army being pushed into the Shan State (which Burma claimed as its territory) by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces in 1950.  The KMT supported itself through 
the native opium trade and clandestine U.S. aid, but after trying and failing several times 
to mount successful offensives back into China, it settled in to stay.  As Kaufman notes, it 
set up “a state within a state,” with opium exports (traded with the help of the Thai army) 
as its primary industry.140  This lasted until 1961 when the Burma Army, with 
considerable assistance from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, drove the KMT 
from its strongholds and across the border into Thailand.141 
After this, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and many ethnic militias 
followed the KMT’s example of protecting and taxing the opiate business.  Of course, 
with the heavily involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia as part of its Cold 
War anti-communism efforts, the CPB was another enemy to be dealt with at all costs.  
Through the Thai military, border police and intelligence groups (that were also fighting  
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their own armed communist movement), the CIA supported certain ethnic militias in 
Burma against the CPB.  At least some of these groups were at the same time benefiting 
from the opium business.142   
Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s, notable warlords with fuzzy 
motivations arose in the Shan State.  It was often unclear whether they were ethno-
nationalists or communists, drug lords, cronies of Rangoon, or a combination of these.  The 
most predominant such leaders were: General Li of the KMT (commanding groups in Burma 
from Thailand), Li Hsing Ho of the Rangoon-supported “home guard,” also known as the Ka 
Kwe Ye (KKY), Kyi Myint (Zhang Zhiming) of the CBP, and the infamous Khun Sa of the 
Shan United Army (SUA).143  The high level of corruption in Thailand continued to 
contribute to the trade, despite coups and other changes in the internal political arena.144 
Although the Golden Crescent by most reports did not surpass the Golden Triangle in 
opium production until 1990-91,145 1975 marked the beginning of events that would 
eventually result in the bulk of world production shifting to the mountains of Central Asia.  
This happened for a variety of reasons:  new communist governments in Laos and Vietnam 
disrupted traditional trafficking routes; a long Southeast Asia drought lasted from the late 
1970s to the early 1980s; and Thailand increased its anti-drug and crop substitution 
programs, and its growing economy provided economic alternatives.146  
In Burma, the CPB continued as the most powerful player in the Shan State, a state in 
and of itself, supported by the opiate trade, until it finally disintegrated in the late 1980s.  
Surrenders, splits, and betrayals continued to occur within and between the various ethnic 
militias. The existence of the KKY home guard, allied to the government, showed that some 
ethnic leaders could be co-opted through promises of a cut of the opium trade and 
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amnesty.  Through the KKY, even the government had found a way to benefit from the 
opiate business.  At one point, Khun Sa, the most powerful warlord and drug king pin, 
made a secret deal with the government to attack Shan nationalists “in exchange for a 
free hand in the opium trade.”147  
In the 1990s, Rangoon forces “captured” Khun Sa with no noticeable long-term 
reduction in the heroin trade.148 This led to rise of a new power in northeast Burma, Bao 
Youxiang of the United Wa State Army (UWSA).  Bao, an ex-CPB commander, 
organized his 20,000-man force around the Wa ethnic group that had once formed the 
core of the CPB army.  The bulk of Burma’s opium and heroin trade took place in UWSA 
territory, and now it purportedly controls the bulk of Burma’s methamphetamine 
production as well.149  According to Jelsma: “Today about 700 million tablets 
(methamphetamine) are thought to be shipped from Burma across the border to Thailand, 
corresponding to about twenty tons of methamphetamine or 7.5 percent of global 
manufacture.”150  So despite the reduction in Golden Triangle opium production (see 
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Table 2.   Golden Triangle Potential Opium Production in Metric Tons151  
 1940 1944 1970 1979 1981 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990* 1991 
Burma 935 997 1125 1544 1621 1728
Laos ? 198 267 278 202 196 
Thailand 
15.5 97 713 161 (Drought) 650 
26 24 17 31 20 23 
    Drought        
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Burma 1660 1790 1580 1660 1760 1670 1300 895 1080 1090 828
Laos 128 169 120 128 140 147 123 124 167 134 112 
Thailand 14 17 3 2 5 4 8 8 6 6 9 
      
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Burma 810 370 312 315 460 
Laos 120 43 14 20 9 
Thailand 5 2 2 3 4 
* 1990-91 was the period in which most reports say the Golden Crescent passed the Golden Triangle in 
total opium poppy production. 
 
In summary, opium had different effects at different times, depending on 
resources available and changing political strategies.  This suggests opium was not a 
cause of conflict or peace, but rather could be used as an enabler of either.  As Snyder 
observes:  
…in Burma, opium initially fueled chaos by providing income for rebel 
armies. After 1990, however, lootable resources had a different effect: 
They contributed to the consolidation of a stable military regime that 
ended the civil war and forcibly imposed political order. The successful 
construction of institutions of joint extraction by the Burmese military 
transformed opium from a source of conflict into a source of order.152 
Relative to the last 60 years of history in Burma, this observation is accurate on the 
surface.  While it is probably true that the military regime is stronger, the jury remains 
out on whether drug money’s corrupting influence will actually make it more stable.  In 
addition, the imposition of political order to which opium contributed is highly debatable. 
The cease-fires Rangoon enjoys with these proto-states (funded in significant part by 
opium and methamphetamines) are delicate matters.  One can argue that the longer some 
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of these entities are allowed autonomony to develop their own economies, without 
disarming, renewed hostilities could result in much larger problems with Naypyidaw (the 
new center of Burman state power).   A basic question is: at what expense to 
Naypyidaw’s state influence and penetration did this “order” result? 
C. PROTO-STATE ENABLERS 
This section focuses on the Shan State of Burma, since as mentioned above; it 
continues to be the epicenter of opium production in the Golden Triangle, in addition to 
one of the hotbeds of warfare within the region.  It is also in the Shan State that the proto-
state of this chapter’s case study emerged. 
1. Borders and Colonial Legacy  
Since migrating from southern China into the highland valleys of Burma more 
than 10 centuries ago, the Shan ethnic group alternately conquered or were conquered by 
the lowland Burmans, and fought Mongols, Chinese, and other ethnic hill tribes 
(including the head-hunting Wa) on different occasions.  The Shan were powerful rivals 
of the Burmans for several centuries until 1604, when they capitulated to a loose 
suzerainty under the lowlanders.153 
Later, during the colonial period of the late 1800s, a small British force traveled 
throughout what was then known as the Shan States to establish the Empire’s own 
suzerainty of the various Shan princes or Sawbwas and the hill tribes.  Some resisted 
more than others.  The British wanted to ensure control over the inhospitable region 
between its India-Burma colony and French Indo-China, and claim access to the wood 
and mineral resources.154  In fierce competition with the French in Mainland Southeast 
Asia, Britain employed the buffer strategy used elsewhere throughout its empire.  A 
British governor oversaw the territory as the Federated Shan States, with an attendant 
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council.  This system fell outside the parliamentary political system set up to govern the 
lowland area of central Burma. Shan feudal lords ruled the Shan states (around 30 in 
number) throughout the entire British colonial period, outside of the political processes 
and bureaucratic development taking place in Burma’s center.155  For the Shan, it seemed 
that whoever ruled Burma made little difference, as long as they enjoyed autonomy. 
It was during this period that the British settled with its neighbors some the 
external borders of the Shan State as they appear on maps today.  The Siam-Shan State 
border was established in 1892 and the Mekong River marked the line with French 
Indochina (Laos).  Much of the border between the Shan State and Yunnan, China, 
including a “200-mile border stretch of Wa-Lahu country,” was not “demarcated” at this 
time.156  In fact, demarcation of the entire China-Burma border was not accomplished 
until 1960.157 (Although one must question the validity of a state’s border demarcation if 
it controls very little of the territory adjacent to this border.) 
Like in so many places where European colonial powers drew arbitrary 
boundaries in the interest of their empires, “international” borders mean little to the 
people living near them in Northeastern Burma/Southwestern Yunnan.  Two excerpts in 
particular illustrate this point.  First, as Chin and Zhang describe: 
China and Myanmar share more than 2,000 kilometers of a common 
border, most of which is loosely guarded.  Local villagers have for 
centuries traversed back and forth without regard to which country they 
may step on in carrying out commercial, agricultural, as well as familial 
activities.  Chinese farmers lease land from their relatives or friends on the 
Myanmar side to grow and harvest crops.  Local women and children 
comb the hills straddling the two countries to gather mushrooms and herbs 
each year...Because of dense vegetation in this near-tropical climate 
region, it is often difficult to tell where Chinese territory ends and 
Myanmar begins.  Local people use official border crossings because they  
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are on main roads and are easier for transporting heavy goods. Otherwise, 
unguarded pathways over the hills are just as convenient for those who 
want to avoid the border police.158 
Specific to the Shan State’s borders with neighboring countries, Arnott writes: 
In areas like mountainous northeast Burma/southwest China, people 
moved where their needs took them. Family or cultural links to the local 
populations or the demands of local warlords or village heads were more 
important than any concept of nationality. Thus, Chinese-speaking people 
have been moving in and through and out of Burma for thousands of 
years. The Wa, Lahu, Shan and Kachin live on both sides of the 
China/Burma border.159 
The picture painted by these authors is of ethnic groups with easy mobility across an 
international boundary.  This gives them a sort of “economic depth” (albeit a poor one, as 
poverty lies on both sides of the line).  Shared culture and language make trade more 
efficient, particularly in the Eastern Shan State and Wa areas.  For example, as an official 
Chinese website states, most of “The Va (Wa) ethnic minority, with a population of 
396,610, live in Ximeng and Cangyuan,” which are called “autonomous counties,”160 and 
situated directly across the border from Shan State Wa country. 
2. Ethno-nationalism and Communism 
In the Shan State, the challenging terrain of isolated valleys and highlands, 
combined with many migrations of people over the centuries, created a veritable stew of 
tribes and ethnicities. The Shan ethnic group (related to the Thai and Lao) is the 
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traditional plateau valley dweller, while smaller hill-tribes live in the uplands, particularly 
in areas adjacent to the Chinese border.161 (See Figure 6 below.) 
Figure 6.   Burma (Myanmar) and the Shan State (After: United Nations Department of      




                                                 
161 “Shan State,” The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
2007), http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0844700.html (accessed December 13, 2007). 
162 United Nations Department of Public Information, January 2004, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/myanmar.pdf (accessed December 13, 2007).  Ethnic 
group distribution inset map from: Curtis N. Thomson, “Political Stability and Minority Groups in Burma,” 





As the largest ethnic minority in the ethnically complex Shan State, the Shan 
make up nine percent or 4.2 million of Burma’s total population of 47 million.  Most 
Shan practice Hinayana Buddhism.163  Smaller ethnic groups with notable population 
sizes (above 100,000) are the Akha (100,000), the Chinese (400,000), the Kachin 
(500,000-1,500,000), the Lahu (170,000-250,000), the Palaung (300,000-400,000), and 
the Wa (400,000).164  Many other smaller groups also exist. 
It was from this ethnic stew that numerous militias emerged during the first 
decade after British departure.  Within the Shan State, the Shan were one of the last to 
rise up, while smaller ethnic groups like the Pa-O fought with Rangoon almost from the 
beginning.  With the approach of Burma’s independence, many Shan feudal princes 
smelled the winds of change.  They threw their lot in with the Nationalist Burmans, under 
the independence movement leadership of the charismatic Aung San, and signed the 
Panglong Agreement in February 1947.  This document guaranteed them “full autonomy 
in internal administration” and “the right to secede from the Union of Burma after a ten-
year period of independence–that is, in 1958–should they be dissatisfied with the new 
federation.”165  The 1947 Constitution also included these rights for the Shan, with all the 
individual fiefdoms combined into a single Shan State.166 
Ten years passed, and Prime Minister U Nu stated Rangoon’s position on the 
possibility of Shan secession clear, saying that the Union must be preserved:167 this 
despite the promises of the Constitution and Panglong Agreement.  Soon thereafter, the 
first Shan army grew out of a local Shan militia–armed by the Burmese Army to fight the 
KMT–that was sympathetic to a Shan nationalist named Sao Noi.  He founded the Noon 
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Suk Harn, or “Young Brave Warriors,” genuinely dedicated to freedom for the Shan.  
The initial core group of this movement was motivated primarily by grievance against 
Rangoon.  However, the KMT had set the example for the region by funding itself with 
the opium trade, and from the beginning, the Shan resistance followed suit.  It set its first 
camp up near the Thailand border so it could maintain friendly contacts with the Thai 
authorities and exact protection taxes from opium mule caravans traveling through its 
territory.  More people joined, some university students, dissatisfied with Ne Win’s new 
Caretaker Government.  Some came because they wanted freedom for the Shan, and 
some came to benefit from smuggling and other border business ventures.168 
One of the chief problems with this first armed movement was that it was in no 
way associated with established Shan political leaders, and had no real political voice.  In 
fact, Lintner records that (text in parentheses is my own): 
On 24 April 1959–during the reign of Ne Win’s Caretaker Government–
all thirty-four saohpas (Shan princes) had formally given up their 
position…The Shan states had become Shan State (again!), administered 
by an elected state government.  Rangoon probably viewed this as a 
victory over the “feudal chiefs” who had “surrendered their powers,” 
while the Shans saw it was the formal finalisation of a movement that had 
begun several years before: the saohpas did not hand over power to 
Rangoon, but to the elected Shan State government.169 
Even in 1959, most of the Shan State leaders believed that a peaceful solution was 
possible that involved a better federal system.  They, like the central government, thought 
the Shan State was better off within the Union.  U Nu agreed to hold talks.  For the Shan 
leaders, the central government still offered an open ear, while the military was a beast 
ravaging its land.  The discussions for an equitable solution slowly continued, past the 
end of the Caretaker Government in 1960 that saw U Nu’s return to the position of Prime 
Minister, and all the way up until 1962.170  It was this split between traditional Shan  
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elites and Shan “educated youth” with “anti-feudalist” sentiments that caused the 
“disunity of Shan nationalism.”171  This is a primary causal factor of the fragmentation 
this section details. 
Out in the countryside, the armed Shan resistance was already transforming.  By 
1960, after its first clash with Burmese forces, the Noon Suk Harn became fragmented 
when a group split off and formed the Shan State Independence Army (SSIA).  This 
began a long string of break-offs and general fragmentation that ensured the Burmese 
Army never faced a fully unified Shan resistance.  Nor did the various other ethnic 
minority groups form effective alliances between themselves or with the CPB, despite 
many efforts. (See Figure 7 below.) 
Figure 7.   Armies in the Shan State: Fragmentation172 (Blue= Shan, Gray= Chinese, Pink= 
Communist, Yellow= Other Ethnic, Boldface= Major drug trafficking organizations, Italics=Still 
Fighting) 
Name of Armed Group Years Fighting Rangoon/Status 
Nook Suk Harn “Young Brave Warriors” 1958-?? (now defunct) 
Shan State Independence Army (SSIA) 1960-1964 
Shan National United Front (SNUF) 1961-1964 
Shan National Army (SNA) 1961-1964 
Shan State Army South (SSA-S) 1964-present 
Shan State Army North (SSA-N) 1995-present (cease-fire) 
Shan State National Army (SSNA) 1995-2005 (cease-fire, then joined SSA-S in 2005) 
Shan National Independence Army (SNIA) 1966-1968 
Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) 1969-1984 and combined named used until 1998 by 
SSA-N/S/SSNA 
Tai-land Revolutionary Council (TRC) 1984-1985 
Mong Tai Army (MTA) 1987-1996 (a Khun Sa outfit) 
Shan Nationalities People’s Liberation Army 
(SNPLA) 
1974-1989 
Tai Independence Army (TIA) 1978-?? (now defunct) 
Kuomintang (KMT) 1950-1961 (after 1961, operated through proxies) 
Kokang Revolutionary Force (KRF) 1963-1964 
Kokang People’s Liberation Army (KPLA) 1967-1968 
Shan State Revolutionary Army (SSRA) 1976-?? (now defunct) 
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Shan United Army 1972-1985 (a Khun Sa outfit) 
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) 1939-1989 (in Shan State from 1968-1989) 
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(MNDAP) 
1989-present (Main drug trafficking 
organization in Burma in 1999) 
United Wa State Army (UWSA) 1989-present (verbal cease-fire in 1989 but have 
had sporadic skirmishes with govt. forces) 
National Democratic Alliance Army 1989-present  (cease-fire in 1989) 
Shan State Communist Party (SSCP) 1956-1958 
Akha 1967-1970 (joined communist group) 
Pawngyawng National Defense Force (PNDF) 1949-1950 (joined CPB; Kachin ethnic group) 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 1961-present (cease-fire agreement signed in 1994) 
Lahu National United Party/Lahu State Army 1973-1984 (surrendered in 1984) 
Pa-O groups (five iterations, now Pa-O National 
Army, as a junta-recognized militia) 
1948-present (signed peace treaty in 1991) 
Pa-O People’s Liberation Organization (PPLO) 1991-present (camped near Thai-Burma border) 
Kayan Newland Party (KNLP) 1964-present (peace treaty in 1994) 
Palaung National Front (PNF) 1963-1964 
Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA) 1976-present (signed peace treaty in 1991) 
Wa National Army (WNA) 1974-present (ally of SSA-S) 
It is important to note that many of the armies that operated or still exist in the Shan 
State are not purely Shan.  Sometimes groups contain members with many different ethnic 
identities.  Other groups without Shan members, or very few, used the word “Shan” to 
identify themselves for political reasons: a prime example being warlord/druglord Khun Sa’s 
Shan United Army (SUA) that was mostly “ethnic Chinese.”173 
In 1962, the Burman military under General Ne Win staged a coup during which it 
promptly removed (murdered or jailed) many prominent Shan leaders, and soon released 
“The Burmese Way to Socialism” document to justify its actions.  Ne Win also discarded the 
1947 Constitution.174  When the military slaughtered students protesting the coup at Rangoon 
University, the ranks of the Shan armies swelled (as did other armed ethnic militias and the 
CPB all around the country).175  By 1964, the ethnic militia and CPB surge expanded well 
beyond its previously limited area of operations: “The government soon controlled little more 
than major towns and occasionally, the roads between them.”176 
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This CPB resurgence, after being slowly squeezed throughout the 1950s by 
Rangoon, was also function of considerable (and very open) Chinese support.177  In 
1968, as part of the group’s overarching strategy, it began to establish a strong base in the 
eastern Shan State with the eventual goal of linking up with its traditional core areas in 
central Burma.  In the Northeast, it made many attempts to incorporate the plethora of 
ethnic groups under its banner, with mixed success.  The Kachins and Wa in particular 
put up stiff resistance.  Eventually, it established four major “War Zones” in the 
Northeast and dealt Rangoon’s army many losses.  Its plan to link up with the center 
failed, however, and by 1975 it had lost its traditional lowland strongholds.  In contrast, 
its territory in the Northeast took on the character of a proto-state, with its own “civil 
administration,” “schools,” “clinics” and taxation system. 178 
The loss of the central strongholds, combined with Mao’s death in 1976, set into 
motion the long, slow decline of the CPB.  China’s new leadership under Deng focused 
on economic growth and regional stability.  Sponsorship of the CPB and other communist 
groups in Southeast Asia did not support these new goals and so support gradually 
waned.  China’s new foreign policy led to warming of relations between Burma and 
China, which resulted in trade deals and Chinese investment. Faced with these major 
setbacks, the CPB revived efforts at alliance with ethnic armies in the Northeast, but 
experienced only limited and temporary success.179 
For the ethnic minorities that did fight for the CPB, the motivation for fighting 
Rangoon stemmed from ethno-nationalism or the desire for ethnic group self-
determination, rather than from communist ideology.  These ethnic minorities comprised 
the bulk of the soldiers and small unit leaders, with two-thirds coming from the Wa 
ethnic group.  There were also Kokang Chinese, Shan and Kachin among others.180   
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Another concern of the CPB included securing new sources of funding.  At first, it 
relied heavily upon the taxing of all trade that passed in and out of its area, to and from 
China, and to a lesser extent on taxing the people of its territory.  This worked during the 
late 1970s because it controlled the majority of the main border crossings.  In 1980, 
however, the Chinese open trade all along its border with Burma.  With so many alternate 
routes now open, CPB trade taxation revenue dwindled.  The CPB turned to the only two 
cash crops in its territory, tea and opium, with opium being by far the more lucrative.181  
As Lintner writes:  
The CPB…allowed increasing numbers of heroin refineries to operate 
within its own base area…they had to pay “protection fees” and other 
taxes…The CPB’s official policy was confined to collecting 20 percent of 
the opium harvested in the base area…In addition, there were a 10 percent 
‘trade tax’ on opium that was sold in the local markets and a 5 percent tax 
on any quantity leaving the CPB’s area for other destinations.182 
While this trade helped the CPB and its proto-state lengthen its existence, it also 
weakened it in some ways: such as by corrupting local commanders into setting up their 
own systems for profiting from the lucrative drugs, and corrupting the basic structure so 
that the nascent nationalistic feelings of its foot soldiers (especially the Wa) heated to 
boiling point.183 
The CPB broke up in 1989 when many ethnic sub commanders mutinied, (key 
among these were Wa and Kokang Chinese leaders).  Its old Burman leaders were 
offered amnesty in China.  With the Chinese working behind the scenes, Rangoon co-
opted the United Wa State Army (UWSA), made up of troops that once formed the core 
of the CPB, and used it to fight against the remaining Shan army (the SURA) in exchange 
for a great deal of autonomy.  It employed similar tactics with the other remnants of the 
CPB (see Figure 7 above), and with other ethnic militias throughout the 1990s.  One by 
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one, the majority of the armies in the Northeast that still fought against Rangoon came to 
verbal or written cease-fires or peace agreements. 184 
In summary, the result of all these years of conflict, with myriad groups 
competing for territory in which to scrounge resources for fighting Rangoon, was a mish 
mash of “special regions” throughout the Shan State. (See Figure 8 in the case study 
below.) These “special regions” as they exist today enjoy different degrees of autonomy, 
and some display many state-like attributes, as will be examined in the case study.  The 
fact that the largest minority group, the Shan, have more than one “special region”, was 
due predominantly to the fragmented ethnic nationalism caused by the split between 
traditional elites and the younger educated class.  Another more basic reason is 
geography, as pointed out by Thomson: 
…the distributional pattern complicates the situation, because few groups 
occupy a single continguous territory.  Interaction between most groups is 
especially tenuous: they have been unable to forge viable, broad-based 
political units for long periods.  Clan-based loyalty and incompatible 
minority-group territories, combined with the extremely complex pattern 
of distribution, make any effort to delimit a single minority-group area an 
impossible task.185 
Nonetheless, he goes on to acknowledge that groups like the Shan “control substantial 
amounts of territory and have sufficient support derived from external aid, taxes, and 
trade, they have been the most successful in maintaining separatist objectives.”186  The 
evidence shows that ethno-nationalism contributed to proto-state formation, but 
geography and political factors limited this formation to areas significantly smaller than 
total ethnic group distribution. 
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3. Feudalism and Cultural Factors 
As has been touched upon earlier, the traditional Shan system of government 
approximated a “feudal hierarchy.”187  The extent with which this feudal structure 
incorporated the various hill tribe ethnic groups within the Shan State varied, but it 
followed a pattern according to different types of agricultural areas.  In agricultural areas 
that Leach terms “Zone B,” where rice is grown in the valleys (by Shan), and cash-crops 
like opium are grown on the hill sides (by hill tribes), a compromise between the Shan 
feudal system and a more tribal egalitarian system developed so that the hill peoples (like 
the “Kachins, Palaungs, Wa, etc.”) could get enough food to support themselves.  He 
calls this social-political organization gumsa. 188   
One must be careful, however, in extrapolating the particular characteristics of the 
gumsa system to all Shan-hill tribe relationships, because Leach’s study specifically 
concerned the Shan-Kachin areas.  In extending the idea of gumsa, to say, the Wa region, 
one must take into account that many Wa communities, perhaps more than any other hill 
tribe, were highly isolated and independent due to geography and in some cases, 
headhunting practices.  In most Wa areas, however, Shan and Wa cultural interchange 
was significant, and had occurred over a 500-year time period.189  Hill tribes that grew 
opium used it as a form of currency to purchase food and other goods from the valley 
dwellers in Southeast Asia and Yunnan well into the 20th century.190  
This pattern continues today.  Despite feudal relationships having broken down in 
many areas, poor hill tribe farmers still grow opium to buy the food they need to survive 
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from the better-off valley-dwellers.191  In the past, it was feudal lords that taxed the sale 
of the opium cash crop (or took a portion of the crop themselves), while in modern times 
it was often the ethnic militia or proto-state playing the same role as the feudal lord where 
the gumsa system had broken down, or taxing the hill tribe to valley dweller transactions.  
The gumsa social framework seemed to enable the transition to the current cash-crop 
extraction framework used by proto-states in Northeastern Burma. 
A last socio-cultural concept to be explored as a proto-state enabler is that of the 
nebulous system of opiate distribution that takes the product from the farmer, to the local 
lab, and then into China, Thailand or Laos, and then sometimes beyond.  It is this 
network, after all, that provides the proto-states the capital they need to fund their armies, 
administration, and infrastructure development activities.  In some ways, these networks 
owe much to guanxi, a Chinese word defined here with the help of Yin Fang as an active 
relationship based on either blood or birth, or acquired (a friend, co-worker, etc.), that 
involves “reciprocal exchange between two persons for a specific purpose.”  It is a kind 
of “social investment.”192  As pointed out by Yawghwe, referring to the Shan State opiate 
business in 1993, buyers of opium/heroin at the Thai and Chinese borders with Burma 
are: “tied to larger, informal and loosely structured networks of finance, kinship, patron-
client clusters which extend beyond border areas…”193  
Indeed, Lintner, and Chin and Zhang agree (in opposition to some recent studies) 
that the drug trade leaves ethnic militia and proto-state areas predominantly through 
“loose networks,”194 as opposed to “triad-type criminal organizations.”195  This is 
significant, because it means that the proto-states are not being directly propped up by a 
                                                 
191 Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East Asia 2007: Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand (United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime, October 2007), 53 and 57, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-
monitoring/2007-opium-SEAsia.pdf (accessed November 29, 2007). 
192 Yin Fang, “Questioning Guanxi: Definition, Classification and Implications,” International 
Business Review 11, no. 5 (October 2002): 47-52. 
193 Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, “The Political Economy of the Opium Trade: Implications for Shan 
State,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 23, no. 3 (1993): 314. 
194 Chin and Zhang, 45. 
195 Bertil Lintner, “Doing Wrong to Do Good,” Irawaddy News Magazine, December 2007, 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=9482&page=1 (accessed February 1, 2008). 
 66
just a few powerful transnational mafia organizations, nor are the proto-states in 
command of international drug distribution networks (there are some individuals proto-
states leadership positions who are involved in these networks for private gain).  There is 
also a lot of room for entrepreneurs in the region to find a place in the trade.196 
D. CASE STUDY: THE UNITED WA STATE PARTY 
Until this point, this chapter has focused on proto-state enablers in the Shan State 
subsection of the Golden Triangle.  This section narrows the focus to the UWSP as a 
proto-state.  Throughout the protracted conflict, the Wa ethnic group was not as united as 
it is today, nor did it always fought on the same “side.”  It has fought in tandem with 
Shan militias, formed the bulk of the CPB army, signed a ceasefire with Rangoon, fought 
against Shan militias, and now controls significant and relatively economically lucrative 
areas along the Thai and Chinese border.  As proto-states stand in Burma, the UWSP is 
the most developed and the most autonomous.  It is the most prominent example of a 
proto-state built through a combination of geography, ethnic self-determinism, extraction 
from illicit cash crops and external support/connections. 
1. Territory 
The current “Wa proto-state” territory is well defined.  Its core area, governed by 
the UWSP, is called “Special Region 2” by the Burman state, and situated directly on the 
border with China, represented by the large dark orange area in Figure 8 below.  The 
capital of the Wa proto-state is Panghsang.  As discussed earlier, the Wa people live on 
both sides of this border, which facilitates trade, but the Wa governance structure does 
not extend into China. The current northern Wa territory sits in the heart of what used to 
be the CPB proto-state, and is actually larger than the traditional Wa region, because the 
Wa continued to occupy the areas the CPB used them to hold.   Therefore, in addition to 
the estimated 285,000 Wa that live in the north, there are also 16 other ethnic groups that 
make up another estimated 115,000 inhabitants.197  
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Figure 8.   The Wa Proto-State and other Ethnic Proto-states in the Shan State (After UN 
















The separate “Southern Command” area of “Special Region 2” is not a traditional 
Wa ethnic homeland.  It exists due to Rangoon agreeing to let the UWSA (soon after the 
latter’s formation) occupy an area along the Thailand-Burma border in return for fighting 
against Khun Sa’s MTA.  The UWSA accepted the offer and moved down to merge with 
a non-communist Wa National Council (WNC) that already had small bases there.  The 
UWSA was told at the time to keep whatever territory it conquered.  Ethnic groups in the 
Shan State particularly valued such territory because it allowed trade access with 
Thailand.198   
                                                 




The junta considers this a temporary arrangement, however, and recently it has 
pressured the UWSA to return to the north.199  Ultimately, the junta wants the UWSP and 
its army moved away from all borders, and returned to the pre-1970s Wa region.  In 
addition to UWSA units, many Wa peasants also live in this region after being forced by 
Wa leaders to relocate from the north beginning in 1999.  This brings the estimated Wa 
population in the south to 115,000.200 
2. Coercive Activities 
a. War Making 
The UWSA is not currently fighting any other groups.  As part of the CPB 
from 1974 to 1989, it staked out its territory through warfare against the junta and other 
ethnic militias.  Immediately after establishing itself in 1989, UWSP negotiated a verbal 
ceasefire agreement with Rangoon, which grants it veritable autonomy within this 
territory.201  The UWSA consists of an estimated 20,000 soldiers armed in part with 
weapons left over from its days with the CPB.  Since then, however, it may have received 
arms from China or purchased more from black market sources.  Although the UWSA 
has fought along with junta forces against the SSA-South several times over the past two 
decades, some reports say that recent clashes are largely for show.202  In terms of the 
proto-state criterion, the UWSA has monopolized the use of force within its territory.  It 
appears to be set on maintaining its current territory as opposed to expanding it. 
                                                 
199 “Burma issues citizenship cards to cease-fire groups for May referendum,” Irawaddy News 
Magazine, March 3, 2008, http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=10671 (accessed April 19, 2008). 
200 Ronald D. Renard, Personal Interview, March 2008. 
201 Lintner, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CBP), 49, 53, 86-91. 
202 Thai Government Official, Personal Interview, February 2008. See also: Michael Black, “On 
Myanmar-China Border, Tensions Escalate Between SPDC, Narco-Militias,” World Politics Review, 
December 13, 2006, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articlePrint.aspx?ID=413 (accessed March 10, 
2008. 
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b. State Making 
The UWSP enforces order within its territory and tolerates no internal 
rivals, although UWSA commanders often have more power than political officials in 
many areas.  The Burman junta has two army battalions stationed within the region, but 
they are completely disarmed, highly demoralized and play virtually no role as an active 
or effective security force.  The junta has so little influence along in the Wa state and 
along the Wa state’s border with China, that if it wants anything accomplished, it must 
actually go through Beijing, as it did to cut down on illegal lumber trade in 2005. There 
are, however, two administrative areas that are very autonomous and apparently have 
strained relations with Panghsang.203  In securing the “Southern Command area,” the 
UWSA occasionally clashes with the SSA and Lahu militias, which are groups that are 
marginally internal rivals to power.204 
c. Protection 
Simply put, those who do not have permission to run businesses within the 
Wa state are subject to the ungentle ministrations of the UWSA.  It provides protection to 
trade flowing through its territory and to opiate and methamphetamine labs operating in 
its territory.  It does not appear to provide a great deal of protection to the peasants other 
than maintaining a very rough sort of law and order.  It showed preference to Wa 
peasants when displacing other poor ethnic minority peasants to make room for them in 
the “Southern Command” area.205 
d. Extraction 
To maintain itself and its armies, the UWSP extracts a good deal of 
revenue from drug production within its borders, even though it has reduced actual poppy 
production (the most visible form of drug involvement).  Lintner succinctly describes the 
process:  
                                                 
203 Kramer, 38-40.  Also: Ronald D. Renard, Personal Interview, March 2008. 
204 Kramer, 31. 
205 Ibid, 31, 38-42. 
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In fact, any independent operator who wants to manufacture heroin or 
amphetamine-type substances (ATS) inside the UWSP’s territory must get 
permission from a committee consisting of the top leaders of the 
organization, mainly chairman Bao Yuchang and his brothers. For this, 
they pay a fee and that is how the UWSP and its allies finance their 
activities, apart from income from their own laboratories.206 
According to a U.S. State Department official, the Wa are making more money off of 
methamphetamines (yaa baa) than they ever did off of heroin.207 For example, in 
Thailand, a single yaa baa pill costs 30 Thai baht (a little less than U.S.$1) along the 
border with Burma.  If even half of the 800 million pills estimated to have been 
manufactured in Burma in 2002208 were sold for the Thai border price, the revenue would 
be around U.S.$375 million.  Further down the line, a single pill costs 200 baht 
(U.S.$6.25) in Chiang Mai, and 400 baht (U.S.$12.50) on the streets of Bangkok.  The 
tiny pills are easier to transport and labs are easier to hide.209  How much of this revenue 
goes to the Wa proto-state, how much goes to the Burman junta, and how much lines the 
foreign bank accounts of certain leaders and commanders is difficult to calculate.  What 
is clear is that infrastructure is still woefully undeveloped throughout the proto-state. 
Many observe that certain Wa leaders are extremely rich, and have 
invested in many businesses both within and outside the Wa proto-state.210  These cases 
provide examples of guanxi these individuals have maintained throughout Southeast Asia 
and Southern China.  It is unclear if the UWSP provides a cut of its extraction activities 
to the Burman junta at a central level, while evidence exists that local extraction 
cooperation occurs between UWSP/UWSA officials and junta officials (as is the case 
with all cease-fire groups involved in drugs and junta officials.)211 
                                                 
206 Lintner, “Doing Wrong to Do Good.” 
207 U.S. State Department Official, Personal Interview, February 2008. 
208 Chouvy, “The Yaa Baa Phenomenon in Mainland Southeast Asia,” 20. 
209 Thai Government Official, Personal Interview, February 2008. 
210 Kramer, 43-45. 
211 Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe, “Shan State Politics: The Opium-Heroin Factor,” in Trouble in the 
Triangle: Opium and Conflict in Burma, ed. Martin Jelsma, Tom Kramer and Pietje Vervest (Chiang Mai: 
Silkworm Books, 2005), 30-31.     
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In the early 1990s, as the UWSP emerged from the wreckage of the CPB, 
it relied heavily on opium income, all the while making pronouncements that it planned 
to eliminate the crop within the next two decades.  To collect capital from this and other 
taxation schemes on agriculture, import duties, and road tolls, the UWSP established a 
tax system and a central treasury.212  Bao Youlinang and Wei Xuegang currently head the 
financial arm of the proto-state.  Wei is believed to be a major player in the illicit trade, 
which is a reputation he has had since his days as Khun Sa’s banker, prior to joining the 
UWSP.213  Some believe that he is trying to slowly work his way out of the illicit 
business, and point to his reinvestment of profits from his private companies to improve 
the lives of Wa peasants.214 While opium cultivation is now practically non-existence in 
the northern area, rising levels are reported in the south where external agencies have 
little penetration. 215 
3. Identity and Legitimacy 
On the surface, Wa ethnic identity seems to make one a bonifed member of the 
Wa state, and the glue that binds the proto-state together.  However, as Kramer points 
out: “The UWSP leadership has included members of other ethnic groups in the region, 
including Lahu, Kachin, Akha, and Chinese. The extent of the UWSP’s demand for the 
formation of a Wa State seems more based on current territorial control than on 
ethnicity.”216  That said, Wa nationalism trumps ethnic equality in the proto-state, as is 
demonstrated by its treatment of other minority groups in the south (see previous 
section).  In the immediate region, the Wa identify much more closely with the ethnically 
related Chinese than they do the Burmans.  The CPB facilitated this connection by using 
Chinese as its “working language” due to having so many different ethnic groups under 
                                                 
212 Ronald D. Renard, Personal Interview, March 2008. 
213 “Changed Titles Change Druglord’s Status Little,” Shan Herald News Agency, March 31, 2008, 
http://www.shanland.org/drugs/2008/changed-titles-change-druglord2019s-status-little/ (accessed April 3, 
2008). 
214 Milsom, 74-75. 
215 Lintnter, “Doing Wrong to Do Good.” 
216 Kramer, 30. 
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its banner.  This brought the Wa closer together since many had to learn Chinese.217  
Finally, the Wa do not identify wholly with any one religion.  Some are Buddhists from 
either the Hinayana and Mahayana traditions, while others are Christians or animists.218 
The UWSP’s main claim to legitimacy comes first and foremost from being the 
group with the most guns.  This is augmented by development projects accomplished by 
the Wa leadership since the demise of the CPB.  Naypyidaw does virtually nothing for 
the border areas, and even less for the Wa region due to its remoteness and isolation.  To 
the Wa, therefore, anything is better than the nothing they have experienced for so long.  
Roads, hydroelectric power plants and rubber plantations–built in part by Chinese 
investment and foreign aid–are some of the developmental highlights of the UWSP’s 
nearly two decades in power.219  Despite this, north region farmers are struggling with 
the effects of the strictly enforced poppy ban. 
4. Political Goals and other Motivations 
While it is true that the UWSP has formed its own largely autonomous proto-
state, this was not accomplished without compromise with Rangoon.  Kramer claims, 
“…the main political aim of the UWSP is to achieve the formation of a Wa State directly 
under control of the central government in Rangoon and not administered through the  
 
Shan State.”220  It wants this state to include the area along the Thailand border, which is 
something with which Rangoon strongly disagrees.  To this end, the Wa have established 
a law code, which states: 
Starting now, the basic mission of the Wa people is to concentrate on 
peaceful development, solidify various rules and regulations, promote 
democracy, strengthen the legal system, and to become self-sufficient by 
                                                 
217 Ronald D. Renard, Personal Interview, March 2008. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Milsom, 71. 
220 Kramer, 28-29. 
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working together to develop our industry and agriculture, to develop the 
Wa Region into a self-sustaining autonomous region.221 
The UWSP has thus far maintained its autonomy by attempting to cultivate good 
relations with all of its major neighbors (with varying results).  It is particularly close to 
China, which independent sources agree wants the UWSP there as a “buffer” and “source 
of leverage” against the Burman junta.222 
5. Organization and Structure 
The Wa inherited the old CPB hierarchical structure of state and government.  At 
the top of the pyramid (theoretically) is the UWSP leadership which consists of the 
“Politburo,” currently headed by Bou You Xiang, and below this the Wa Central 
Committee.  This central authority oversees the UWSA and the “local administration.”  
All three entities, the UWSP, the UWSA, and the “local administration” have presence at  
the lower levels (districts and townships), in which the senior UWSP official is supposed 
to have highest authority.223  The bureaucratic structure of the state is diagrammed in 
Figure 9 below: 
                                                 
221 Wa Region Basic Law, 2005, Unofficial Translation from Chinese, obtained from Special 
Consultant to UN development project in Wa Special Region Number 2. 
222 Black, 3. This opinion was also expressed by U.S. and Thai officials during Personal Interviews, 
February 2008. 
223 Milsom, 69. 
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Figure 9.   Organization of the Wa Proto-state Bureaucracy (From: Ronald D. Renard) 
 
Despite its authoritarian bent, governance in the Wa proto-state remains weak.  Kramer 
attributes this to lack of education, lack of experience setting up state institutions, “low or 
nonexistent” salaries, and extremely limited delegation of decision-making.224  Efforts to 
improve governance continue, but isolation and lack of outside assistance continue to 
slow Wa development. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter opened by describing the history of the opium trade in the Golden 
Triangle with a focus on Burma’s Shan State, since it has been the highest-producing 
area.  This section showed that the opium trade was present in the region as part of fully 
legal opium monopolies of the British, Thai and others.  In the Shan State (and Golden 
Triangle), production remained low compared to other parts of the world until launched 
onto the world stage due to the war economy of Southeast Asia in the second half of the 
20th century and the opium ban in Mao’s China.  Next, proto-state enabling factors were 
examined, beginning with the British colonial legacy and its attempt to incorporate huge 
swaths of Shan and hill tribe land under a central Burman state that never had more than 
                                                 
224 Kramer, 39-40. 
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an extremely weak claim to these territories.  After this, the decades-long ethno-
nationalist and communist war against the Rangoon state was examined to see how ethnic 
separatist movements led to the formation of proto-states.  Geography (causing wide 
distribution of ethnic groups within difficult terrain) and internal political divisions 
played a role in armed group fragmentation (even within ethnic groups).  Finally, a 
hybrid of Shan feudalistic governance that developed in certain agricultural zones with 
hill tribes was found to correlate with opium production, and set the stage for proto-state 
extraction schemes. 
The last section dealt with the case study of the UWSP as a proto-state, evaluated 
according to the five-part framework laid out in Chapter I.  This evaluation showed that 
the UWSP quite clearly meets the criteria of a proto-state built in significant part by 
opium cash cropping, and now methamphetamine production.  Due to its isolation and 
lack of alternatives, however, this reliance on illicit drugs is due to the six decades old 
survival strategy that has been ingrained in all the armies fighting the Burman junta.  It is 
not a relationship that is easy to break, and change relies on providing lucrative economic 
alternatives to the farmers that engage in poppy farming also just to survive. 
As in Chapter II, viewing the conflicts in Northeastern Burma through a state-
building lens has been useful for sorting out why strife has lasted for so long.  While the 
cease-fires with the proto-states have more or less held for 15 or more years, if the junta 
is not willing to develop the region, or force the groups to lay down their arms and 
embrace licit business pursuits, how long can the relative calm last?  China’s interests in 
the region relative to its security and economic agenda may play the deciding role in 
whether the region degenerates again into general conflict. 
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IV. PROTO-STATES COMPARED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters described how the borders of Afghanistan-Pakistan and 
Burma, as they exist on a map today, encompass areas that are in embroiled in a kind of 
“warring states” periods in which new political entities are arising out of old feudal and 
tribal structures.  Drawn to suit British colonial interests, the lines did little to help decide 
which sub-group within would have legitimate state and national power.  This is why the 
process of “figuring it all out” continues.  In conventional terms, the long-running 
conflicts in these two places are considered “insurgencies” and “civil wars,” but these 
terms assume that some kind of nation-state exists within these arbitrary borders.  This 
thesis maintains that no nation-states exist in these borders.  They are not “weak states” 
or “failed states.”  Instead, there are proto-states within these areas that are at various 
stages of development.  Both proto-states contain (or did until recently) peasant farmers 
who grow the opium poppy for “cash” in addition to other crops, and feudal political 
structures that correspond with these cash cropping areas.  The primary questions this 
chapter seeks to answer are: what are the significant similarities and differences between 
the Taliban and UWSP proto-states, and how can these help one understand proto-state 
formation? 
The main argument of this chapter is that while there are many differences, the 
similarities show why the two proto-states have not become subsumed by other powers.  
Both have established core territories in which they are the legitimate coercive force in 
the eyes of the population, and they both use capital from illicit proceeds and external 
sources and allies to fund their armies.  These similarities represent major reasons why 
other states, proto-states and external powers have not been able to defeat them.  While 
the Taliban are at war against Kabul and its Western allies, they have negotiated a 
temporary peace with Islamabad from a position of power.  The UWSP has had a cease-
fire with Rangoon/Naypyidaw for 20 years, and without laying down its arms, enjoyed 
considerable autonomy. 
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This chapter first provides a macro-level overview comparison of the two regions.  
This includes touching on historical similarities, looking at some common indices, and 
commenting on opium production differences.  It then compares the two proto-states of 
the case studies, using each category of the five-part case study framework.  The 
conclusion provides a summary of the most significant comparative findings. 
B. MACRO-LEVEL OVERVIEW 
Historically, both regions contained ethnic territories and fiefdoms incorporated 
into arbitrary states by the British colonial empire.  These fiefdoms contained mixed 
tribal-feudal political structures with peasant farmers at the bottom end of the social scale 
who grew opium poppies in small quantities in addition to food crops.  Many factors, 
chief of which were internationalized war economies in the latter half of the 20th century, 
led to increased opium production (and accompanying opiate production, such as heroin) 
in both regions.  This occurred for two reasons.  First the depredations of war caused 
already poor and neglected peasants to become even more poor and neglected, so opium 
cash cropping became crucial to their survival.  Second, armies on all sides benefited (or 
just survived) by protecting and taxing opiate production and transportation.   The 
internal networks of the drug economies, and sometimes-external links, were built largely 
on culturally specific social-business networks (qawm in the case of the Golden Crescent; 
guanxi in the case of the Golden Triangle). 
What were the results of this potent mixture of misfortune?  This can be seen 
below on Table 3, which lines up Afghanistan, Pakistan and Burma in some of the well-







Table 3.   Regional Comparisons (See footnotes for data sources.) 
 Afghanistan Pakistan Burma 
Level of Freedom225 
(on scale of 1-7, with 1=most free, and 











(ranked from Full Democracy to 
Authoritarian, out of 167 countries, 







Failed States Index227 
(these rankings are out of the 60 




Corruption Perceptions Index228 
(out of 179 countries surveyed, 
179=worst) 
172/179 138/179 179/179 
Human Development Index229 
(Developing Countries Average= 
0.691; World Average=0.743 




Gross Domestic Product230 
(Purchasing power parity (PPP), 
Official exchange rate (OER)) 
$35 billion (PPP) 
$9.9 billion (OER) 
$446.1 billion (PPP) 
$106.3 billion (OER) 
$91.13 billion (PPP) 
$13.7 billion (OER) 




   
                                                 
225 Freedom in the World 2007 Report, Freedom House, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=372&year=2007 (accessed April 28, 2008). 
226 Index of Democracy 2007, Economist Intelligence Unit, 
http://www.intute.ac.uk/socialsciences/cgi-bin/fullrecord.pl?handle=20070423-091817 (accessed April 28, 
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227 The Failed States Index 2007, Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine, July/August 2007, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865&page=7  (accessed May 1, 2008). 
228 Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, Transparency International, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 (accessed April 28, 2008). 
229 United Nations Human Development Report (United Nations Publication, 2007/2008), 231-233, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/ (accessed April 28, 2008). 
230 GDP and GDP per capita figures from: World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed April 28, 2008). 
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% GDP opiate sector231 40% No data available 1% (this is extremely 
difficult to even estimate) 
Yearly Total Income: opium poppy 
growing households 
Italics=amount from opium 
U.S.$ 3,933.00 
U.S.$ 1,965.00 
No data available U.S.$ 501.00 
U.S.$ 227.00 
Opium Farmgate price 
(farmgate price is the price the 
farmer gets for sale of opium) 
$86/kg No data available $256.00/kg 
Average opium yield per ha 42.5 kg/ha No data available 16.6 kg/ha 
Unsurprisingly, there are many similarities: the regimes of the so-called central 
states are oppressive and authoritarian, state capacity is extremely weak, and corruption is 
rampant.  One of the noticeable differences appears in Pakistan’s significantly larger 
GDP, however, the per capita GDP in the NWFP and FATA is 40 percent below the rest 
of Pakistan.232   
Among the opium data, one standout is Afghanistan’s percentage of GDP based 
on the opiate sector, as estimated by UNODC, showing how thoroughly the illicit 
economy penetrates the region.  Another striking difference is in “yearly total income” 
between opium poppy growing households in Afghanistan and Burma, and the large 
difference in opium yields.  The opium farmers in Burma appear overall significantly 
poorer, while farmers in Afghanistan seem to beating the GDP per capita for the country.  
The yield difference is attributable to the strain of opium poppy grown (bulb size, 
weather and cultivation techniques).233 
A final trend of interest is reflected in Table 4 below.  The possibility of a 
correlation appears if one contrasts this data with other activities in the regions.  First, the 
cease-fires the Burman junta signed with ethnic militias and proto-states in the early 
1990s as discussed in Chapter III, and the steady decline of opium cultivation occurred 
                                                 
231 All opium information from: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007 (United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime, October 2007), 7, www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan-Opium-Survey-
2007.pdf (accessed April 10, 2008). Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East Asia 2007, 1. 
232 North West Frontier Province Economic Report (The World Bank, 2005), iv, 
http://www.worldbank.org.pk/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/PAKISTANEXTN
/0,,contentMDK:20764712~menuPK:293057~pagePK:64027988~piPK:64027986~theSitePK:293052,00.ht
ml (accessed April 16, 2008). 
233 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, 63-69. 
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during the same time.  Cultivation in Afghanistan has climbed steadily since the early 
1990s, which as Chapter II noted, was the same period in which the Taliban emerged and 
began their once nearly successful conquest of Afghanistan.  In short, opium cultivation 
decreased in the Golden Triangle when war ceased and proto-state borders were defined, 
while in Afghanistan, opium production increased (and continues to increase) as conflict 
continues and the Taliban increasingly rely on opiates for funding. While other factors 
are also at play, this possible connection bears further consideration. 
Table 4.   Regional Opium Cultivation Comparison (From: United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime) 
 
 
C. MICRO-LEVEL: THE TALIBAN AND UWSA/UWSP 
On the surface, these two proto-states look very different.  When lining up the two 
according to the case study framework, some parallels and divergences emerge, as can be 





Table 5.   Taliban and UWSP Comparison234 
 Taliban UWSP 
Estimated Ethnic Group 
Populations (total, not 
just in proto-state) 





Estimated Army Size 7,000-17,000 Afghanistan 
40,000 Pakistan 
20,000 
Length of Existence 1994-present (14 years) 1989-present (19 years) 
Territory Unconsolidated, power varies by 
area and often challenged 
internally. 
Consolidated, but split into 2 
unconnected areas; power 
unchallenged internally 
Coercive Activities   
War making External conflict- trying to regain 
territory lost in 2001 
Occasional skirmishes with other 
ethnic militias; cease-fire with Burman 
junta 
State making Internal conflict- trying to maintain 
hold on territory in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan 
Internal competition eliminated; a few 
autonomous army commanders 
Protection Protection of farmers, drug labs, 
trucker mafia, traffickers; Local 
justice based on Sharia Law 
Protection of officially approved 
business (some illicit) and border 
trade; Local justice based on Wa/CPB 
traditions 
Extraction Taxation of cash-crops (opium), 
opiate and other drug production, 
and trade 
Taxation of cash-crops (opium), 
methamphetamine production, trade, 
other agricultural business 
Identity & Legitimacy Religious, Ethnic; legitimacy 
varies by area; strongest in FATA 
core; swift justice meted out by 
Ethnic; legitimacy strong except 
among a few small minorities; swift 
justice meted out by local leaders 
                                                 
234 The source information for this Table is taken from earlier chapters of this thesis. 
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local leaders 
Political Objectives An Islamic State in Afghanistan Autonomous state within Union of 
Burma 
Organization & Structure Decentralized; largely autonomous 
regional leadership 
Hierarchical 
The territorial situations of the Taliban and UWSP are simultaneously alike and 
unalike.  Both have core areas, the Taliban in Waziristan, and the UWSP in the northern 
“Special Region 2.”  The primary area of opium extraction for the Taliban (southern 
Afghanistan), however, does not lie in its core area.  The UWSP’s primary opium 
extraction area used to lie within its core area, but now exists in its “Southern Command” 
area.   In addition, the UWSP does not seek additional territory at this time, while the 
Taliban still claim the goal of controlling Kabul and in effect all of Afghanistan.  For the 
Taliban, contestation by other powers of all but its core area remains very strong.  For the 
UWSP, contestation of its territory by the Burman state exists, but currently is very weak. 
In general, the coercive activities practiced by both proto-states are similar to 
those practiced anywhere in attempting to achieve and maintain sovereignty.  The 
Taliban are in effect starting over at an earlier stage of state building after their major 
defeat in 2001, and so in the realms of war making and state making, face serious 
competition and challenges.  The UWSP, having been since 1988 only involved in small 
skirmishes outside its territory and virtually uncontested within, is further along in the 
state building process.  For many years, it has concentrated on development of 
governance and infrastructure, with considerable help from the outside. 
The Taliban and UWSP share the greatest similarities in the activities of 
protection and extraction.  At the most basic level, both benefit from taxing the trade that 
passes through their territories, licit and illicit.  Regarding opiates (and now 
methamphetamine for the Wa), protection of production and transportation is nearly 
identical for both proto-states, differing only in the percentages.  The profits could be 
considerable.  For example, during the two regions’ peak producing years of the last two 
decades, opium harvest taxation alone brought the Taliban an estimated $25 million 
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(2007)235, and the UWSP an estimated $5-7 million (early 1990s).236  In neither case 
have these proto-states ever been forced to completely rely on the opiate economy and 
trade taxation alone.  As discussed in the earlier chapters, both enjoy external support, the 
Taliban from supporters in Pakistan other Muslim countries, and the UWSA from China.  
It is therefore inaccurate to posit that somehow destroying the drug economy would cause 
proto-state collapse. 
In the category of identity and legitimacy, ethnicity is at the basic level of both 
proto-states’ identity, but in the Taliban’s case, religious identity overlays this at the 
ideological level.  In comparison, the UWSP appears to be without ideology save for 
residual communistic influences.  As mentioned in Chapter III, however, the working Wa 
law code claims to seek the promotion of democracy.  Legitimacy for both proto-states 
relies first and foremost on the gun, but unlike the Taliban who are still locked in conflict, 
the UWSP has been able to accomplish some development, which helps boost its 
legitimacy. 
The political objectives of the UWSP and the Taliban widely differ.  The UWSP 
is a separatist proto-state, but does not seek its own nation-state.  It prefers to be an 
autonomous state within the Union of Burma, as opposed to a sub-entity of the Shan 
State, and is willing to fight to achieve this goal.  The Taliban, on the other hand, possess 
a core area like the UWSP, but still seek to expand their influence.  The Taliban proto-
state has ambitions to control the entirety of Afghanistan, and institute an Islamic state.   
The more limited extent of the UWSP’s objectives may ensure its continued survival, 
which is a factor the Taliban may eventually consider in negotiations with Kabul as the 
conflict continues. 
The organizational structure of the two proto-states differs considerably.  While 
the Taliban are decentralized, the UWSP retains the rigid hierarchical structure that the 
CPB copied from the Chinese Communist Party.  The decentralization of the Taliban is a 
necessary strategic survival mechanism in the face of pressure from the United States, the 
                                                 
235 Anonymous Afghanistan Analyst, Electronic Correspondence, April 2008. 
236 Ronald D. Renard, Personal Interview, March 2008. 
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ISAF and the Kabul state.  It is also quite likely a function of independent leaders and 
differing Pashtun tribal associations in different regions. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The comparative framework of this chapter started at the macro-level, and then 
focused on the case studies.  The chief conclusion is that by viewing “insurgent” groups 
that hold territory and extract capital from the resources of this territory as proto-states, a 
more effective analysis can be made of their capabilities, and therefore, the trajectory of 
the conflict.  The Taliban and UWSP are both building states, but are at different stages 
of the process.  Similarities between the two cluster around opiates, which is the general 
answer to this chapter’s main question. 
As far as conflict trajectory is concerned, these examples show that the opiate 
business has mixed influence on proto-state formation.  While providing capital for 
maintaining armies and in some cases even infrastructure, its illicit status–and therefore 
potential for large, easy profits–facilitates corruption.  Depending on the form this 
corruption takes, state legitimacy might be threatened.  As Geffray writes: “Any kind of 
legitimacy is based on faith, as corrupting criminals well know – and they are careful to 
have an official betray the ideal of the State less out of greed than out of adherence to the 
clientelist ideal that they represent…”237 
The taxation of opium cash cropping, opiate production, opiate transport, and the 
protection of all three has been a correlating factor in the longevity and resilience of both 
the Taliban and the UWSP, the full extent of which is yet to be measured.  Both have also 
benefited extensively from external support in capital and materiel, so it cannot be said 
cash cropping was the sole factor in their survival.  Nor is it possible to tell of the absence 
of either would result in their demises.  The Wa proto-state was built in large part with 
funds extracted from opium cash-cropping and opiate production.  Ironically, while these 
funds helped build the state, they could also help fragment it.  The lure of huge profits is 
too much for some sub-commanders, whose private armies are powerful enough to carve 
                                                 
237 Christian Geffray, “State, Wealth, and Criminals,” Lusotopie (2002): 92. 
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out their own little fiefdoms within the proto-state.238  This “greed” effect could also 
occur within the Taliban, as local commanders become warlords concerned more with 
lining their own pockets instead of pursuing the high leadership’s political objectives. 
If the Taliban proto-state is unsuccessful in achieving its primary goal of 
establishing an Islamic state in Afghanistan, is there a chance it could end up with an 
autonomous area of its own similar to the UWSP?  Negotiations between some Taliban 
leaders and Kabul have taken place, but talks with Mullah Omar have been “ruled 
out.”239  If a deal were somehow struck (that Kabuls external supporters also agreed to), 
and ISAF/U.S. forces did pull back or pull out completely, it is possible some type of 
more stable Taliban proto-state might come into existence, and in the absence of 
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The main research question of this thesis asked:  how do militias (insurgents) 
create drug-funded proto-states within Afghanistan-Pakistan and Burma?  Chapter I 
suggested a multi-faceted situation existing in these two regions that is conducive to 
proto-state formation.  A statement of the main argument followed, which was that ethnic 
and/or religious groups and their armies opposed weak and illegitimate states in Kabul, 
Islamabad and Naypyidaw, in part by occupying territory of opium production and 
extracting capital from the opiate business.  To slightly modify Tilly’s statement: “war 
made proto-states and proto-states made war.”  Next, the chapter reviewed the applicable 
literature broken down into the categories of state building, states within states and causes 
of civil war, finding that the state building approach provided the best explanatory for 
conflict in the two regions studied, since nation-states never existed in them in the first 
place.  The words insurgency and civil war are actually misleading in characterizing these 
conflicts.  Finally, it proposed a five-part framework for analyzing two case studies of 
proto-states, one from each region. 
Chapter II looked at the Afghanistan-Pakistan, attempting to answer the main 
research question specifically in this region.  An additional sub-question was also 
addressed: how do geographic, political, socio-cultural and economic elements shape 
these conflicts?  It first provided a background of opium and conflict, followed by an in-
depth examination of proto-state enablers such as Pashtun ethno-nationalist sentiments, 
concepts of states and borders associated with the Durand Line, feudalism and its 
connection to opium cash cropping, and the role of qawm in the opiate business.  The last 
section was a case study of the Taliban, which concluded that the Taliban did in fact have 
a very rudimentary and still fragmented proto-state with a large chunk of its economy 
based on opium.  It discussed the territory of the Taliban as straddling the line between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, but with a core in Pakistan’s FATA area, and its primary 
political objective the establishment of a Sharia-based Islamic state in Afghanistan. 
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Chapter III used a structure very similar to Chapter II to describe the situation in 
Burma, but with a more history-focused approach.  To answer the same two questions, it 
discussed Southeast Asia hill tribes and opium, and provided a historical background of 
conflict and opium in Burma beginning in 1948, showing how nationalism and political 
failures resulted in increasing ethnic militia fragmentation.  At the same time, the opium 
economy grew as it fueled not just the ethnic militias, but also the Burman state.  Next, 
proto-state enablers were examined in the categories of porous borders and colonial 
legacy, ethno-nationalism and communism, feudalism, and cultural factors such as 
guanxi in the Shan State.  The last section detailed the UWSP as a proto-state, showing 
how after the fall of the CPB, it quickly secured an autonomous area through a tenuous 
cease-fire agreement with Rangoon, followed by development based in part on its opiate 
economy.  Later it largely phased out opium in its territory, but began to rely on 
methamphetamines and other ventures for funding.  It sought to maintain its autonomy, 
but not to declare independence from the Union of Burma, and so far refused to lay down 
its arms. 
Chapter IV compared the two regions at both a macro- and micro-level, asking: 
what are the significant similarities and differences between the Taliban and UWSP 
proto-states, and how can these help one understand proto-state formation?  The macro-
level units of comparison were Afghanistan-Pakistan and Burma, and the micro-level 
units of comparison were the Taliban and UWSP as proto-states.  The macro-level 
section briefly touched on the colonial, tribal-feudal, and opium/war economic 
similarities between the two regions.  It also compared some of the key indices and 
measurements of government, development and economics in order to show the results of 
years of conflict and illicit flows.  The micro-level comparison section highlighted that 
the most striking similarities between the Taliban and UWSP proto-states existed in the 
coercive activities of protection and extraction.  Other similarities appeared in the 
establishment of core territories and legitimacy through force and retributive justice.  
Primary differences manifested in political objectives and identity, in which the Wa 
sought ethnic autonomy and self-determination, while the Taliban wanted to take Kabul 
and install Islamic Sharia law in Afghanistan. 
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The basic thread woven throughout this thesis has been that proto-states funded 
by illicit cash crops of opium explain why the so-called insurgents, who are the proto-
states’ armies, are so hard to defeat.  Once an army or militia establishes a core territory 
with legitimacy and structure, it is no longer just a battle against a rootless, guerilla band.  
A simple distillation of the main argument’s qualitative argument is offered in Figure 10 
below. 
Figure 10.   Formation of the Proto-state 
 
 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The policy implications of this study lie primarily in the realm of conflict 
analysis.  The state building approach, with attention to historical and cultural nuance, 
provides a more comprehensive dissection of the problem. (As opposed to, for example, a 
military counterinsurgency approach, or greed versus grievance evaluation.)  Plainly, 
opium cash cropping is not a cause of conflict in these two regions.  It is driven by 
poverty (and the fact that opium is illegal), which in turn is exacerbated by lack of 
development and war.   
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One of the fundamental pillars of proto-state legitimacy lies in its ability to 
protect its people, including from those seeking to undermine their livelihood.  That is 
why the UWSP opium ban is so interesting.  Due to the lack of viable economic 
alternatives, many Wa farmers are suffering.  Now that three years have passed, they are 
increasingly asking their leadership to allow them to again grow poppies.  Will the 
leadership lose support if it refuses and continues to fail to provide alternatives?  In 
Afghanistan, the Taliban’s legitimacy is boosted by its protection of peasant farmers from 
Kabul’s eradication teams.  Attacking peasant livelihood without providing an alternative 
that is at least as lucrative is not the way to build a legitimate state.  
For policy makers, if the antagonists of a conflict display the attributes of a proto-
state, a much more comprehensive approach is needed.  This includes an emphasis on 
negotiating an end to conflict, followed by a heavy investment in development and 
operations to gain legitimacy.  Bullets and bombs simply cannot solve such conflicts.  
The internal opium issue cannot be effectively dealt with until the proto-state is first 
addressed.  Overall, a comprehensive approach is needed that involves economic reform 
at all levels, a gradual crop substitution scheme, and a counter-drug campaign that goes 
after warlords and traffickers, vice the producers.  Security and substantial economic 
development must first be established for crop substitution methods to work.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While this thesis attempted to address the lack of comparative studies regarding 
cash crop drugs and conflict, it represents just one small step in this direction.  A case 
study of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), using the same 
framework, would strengthen the hypothesis.  In addition, more field research is needed 
to gather quantitative data to supplement the qualitative arguments already put forth.  
Specifically, more data regarding actual proto-state revenue would be extremely helpful, 
but this remains an extremely daunting task.  Interviews such as those of Taliban soldiers 
conducted by Graeme Smith’s associate (see footnote in Chapter II) are particularly 
useful for gaining insight into proto-state workings. 
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Another area of research involves determining the full extent to which opium 
poppy production is returning to Pakistan (to see the increase compared to 2002, see 
Table 1), particularly in the Taliban proto-state core (the FATA).  Since UNODC opium 
production reporting lies in part on visual spot checks (usually with the local authority’s 
assistance), and access to the FATA by outsiders is virtually impossible, is an accurate 
assessment of this even possible?  Opium production in the Taliban core would be 
particularly well protected and easily exploitable by the proto-state, compared to the 
more contestable areas in many parts of Afghanistan. 
Understanding the relationship between opium and conflict is a critical step 
towards finding solutions for problems in the Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle.  If 
this thesis has no other implication for policy or strategy related to conflict and illicit cash 
crops, it should at least highlight the need for a thorough understanding of the historical 
and cultural context, and show that political decisions that do not take into account the 
ground truth are doomed to failure.  This hearkens back to Bernard Brodie’s quote at the 
beginning of this thesis: “Good strategy presumes good anthropology and good 
sociology.”  In addressing the deep-rooted conflicts that plague certain regions of the 
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